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I. INTRODUCTION: THE HIDDEN FALLACY
N Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates P.C. v. Wells,' the United
States Supreme Court established the standards for determining
whether a shareholder in a professional corporation ("PC") is an
1. 123 S. Ct. 1673 (2003).
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"employee" as defined by Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 ("ADA").2 The Court concluded that the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") standards should govern the in-
quiry, with a focus on whether the PC exercises control or has the right to
exercise control over the shareholder. The Supreme Court supported a
"totality of the circumstances" test and an inquiry into various factors
including:
a) whether the organization can hire or fire the individual, set work
rules, and supervise the individual's work,
b) whether and how much the individual can influence the
organization;
c) whether the parties intended an employment relationship; and
d) whether the individual shares in the profits, losses and liabilities of
the organization. 3
Clackamas holds that the function of the individual within the enter-
prise, rather than the form of the organization or the title accorded the
individual, should govern; thus partners of general and limited partner-
ships and shareholders, members, or directors of professional corpora-
tions should all be treated alike, using the same standards. 4
Clackamas overturned the Ninth Circuit's holding that the form of the
organization should govern whether a physician-shareholder who prac-
tices medicine for a PC is an employee. Because the defendants had vol-
untarily adopted a corporate form and the shareholders had employment
contracts with the corporation, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the indi-
vidual physicians were "employees" under the ADA. The Ninth Circuit
decision along with an earlier Second Circuit decision in Hyland v. New
Haven Radiology Associates, P. C.,5 created a split in the circuits, conflict-
ing with EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd.6 In Dowd & Dowd, the Seventh
Circuit held that the courts should take a functional approach, examining
whether the shareholders of a PC were more like partners in a general
partnership or more like employees. If they were more like partners, ac-
cording to the Seventh Circuit, the individuals were "employers" and
therefore could not be "employees" under the anti-discrimination laws. 7
The result in Clackamas is not surprising because it adopts the EEOC
guidelines and ostensibly advocates a functional rather than a formalist
2. Title I of the ADA states in pertinent part:
(a) General rule.
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a dis-
ability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions and privileges of
employment.
42 U.S.C. § 12,112(a) (2000).
3. Clackamas, 123 S. Ct. at 1679-80.
4. Id. at 1680-81.
5. 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986).
6. 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984).
7. Id. at 1178; accord Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1987).
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approach. But Clackamas is nonetheless disappointing because the com-
parison of a shareholder's role to that of a partner relies on two central
fallacious assumptions. First, it improperly assumes that bona fide part-
ners in general partnerships who participate in the management of the
organization and who share the profits and liabilities of the partnership
cannot be "employees" for purposes of the anti-discrimination acts. Sec-
ond, it assumes erroneously that an individual cannot simultaneously be
an "employer" and an "employee" under the anti-discrimination acts.
If these assumptions are disproved, which I propose to do in this arti-
cle, the theoretical foundation upon which Clackamas stands must fall
and Congress should overrule Clackamas and establish a test for deter-
mining employee status that considers both the power of the individual
within the partnership and the connection to the partnership.
Even if Clackamas is not overruled, the Court's decision in Clackamas
gives little guidance to the lower courts in determining which partners are
employees under the anti-discrimination laws. This vagueness leaves
much discretion for decision making that may lead to inconsistent and
erroneous results in the lower courts. In an attempt to avoid these errors
and inconsistencies, this article will address the different possible inter-
pretations of Clackamas and argue that it should be read to permit a close
examination of the relationships within the partnership to decide which
partners are employees. This reading should produce a result consistent
with the language of the anti-discrimination acts that furthers its values
and purposes.
Whichever route is taken-the outright overruling by the legislature of
Clackamas or a liberal judicial interpretation of Clackamas-the standard
for determining whether a partner is an employee should be twofold: 1)
whether the individual wields insufficient power within the organiza-
tion-economic, social, and/or political-to avoid discrimination; and 2)
whether the individual is sufficiently connected to the organization to suf-
fer the economic and dignitary harms resulting from discrimination. If the
answer to both of these questions is "yes," the partner should be an "em-
ployee" under the anti-discrimination acts.8
The issue of whether partners and/or shareholders are "employees"
under the anti-discrimination acts is extremely important to the interpre-
tation and coverage of the law. It affects those partners and shareholders
who work in large and small partnerships and PCS, granting or denying
them the ability to sue the firm for race, color, sex, national origin, relig-
8. The difference between overruling the opinion outright by legislative enactment
and an interpretation that takes these factors into account is procedural. If Congress over-
rules the opinion, I propose that it establish a rebuttable presumption that a partner is an
"employee" under the acts, subject to a defendant's proof by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the partner either has sufficient power to avoid discrimination or is sufficiently
disconnected from the firm to suffer the harms of discrimination. For a full explanation of
this proposal, see infra Part V.A. If Congress does not overturn the opinion, I argue that
the courts would be free to use this test under Clackamas; however, consistent with previ-
ous law, the burden of proof would fall on the partner to establish both prongs of the test
in order to be considered an employee. See infra Part V.B.
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ious, age, or disability discrimination. It also affects partners in a limited
liability partnership ("LLP") 9 and members of a limited liability company
("LLC"). 10 It could conceivably affect the employees of a privately held
corporation. Perhaps even more important, it also governs the applica-
tion of the anti-discrimination acts to small firms whose employees can-
not hold the company accountable for discrimination unless the partners
or shareholders1 1 of the enterprise are counted as "employees." 12
Part II of this article explores a history of the complex coverage issues
presented by the term "employee" under the ADA, Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, 13 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA). 14 Part III analyzes the legal precedent that addresses whether
partners and shareholders are "employees" under the anti-discrimination
acts. Furthermore, it evaluates the Supreme Court's reasoning in Clacka-
9. An LLP is a business form in which the partners do not assume personal liability
for the obligations of the firm. See NEV. REV. STAT. 87.150(2) (2002); J. Dennis Hynes,
Foreword, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1995, at 1, 3; see also Deborah A. DeMott,
Our Partners' Keepers? Agency Dimensions of Partnership Relationships, LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1995, at 109, 123 (noting that the LLP may reduce incentives of partners to
monitor behavior of employees and other partners).
10. An LLC is an entity that does business that is neither a corporation nor a partner-
ship. The LLC provides limited liability for its owners, and it gets the benefits of a partner-
ship for taxation purposes. See Hynes, supra note 9. See generally Wayne M. Gazur, The
Limited Liability Company Experiment: Unlimited Flexibility, Uncertain Role, LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBS., Spring, 1995, at 135.
11. In order to avoid repetition, I use the terms "partners" and "shareholders" to in-
clude all partners who work for a general or limited liability partnership, shareholders in a
professional corporation who actively practice their profession as part of the business as
well as members of a limited liability company.
12. All of the federal anti-discrimination laws set a minimum number of "employees"
a company must have in order to be considered a covered "employer" by the statute. See
infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
13. Title VII, in its relevant part, states:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individ-
ual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, relig-
ion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
14. The ADEA states in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individ-
ual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this
chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2000).
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mas, demonstrating that the decision depends on the faulty concept that
an employer can never be an "employee" under the anti-discrimination
statutes. Part IV offers a more sustained analysis of Clackamas, demon-
strating the opinion's failure to address the issues of economic and social
power, dependence and connectedness of partners who are vulnerable to
discrimination, and the resulting economic and dignitary harms. Part V
offers amendments to the definition of the term "employee," which
would include partners, unless the employer proves by a preponderance
of the evidence that the partner is either powerful enough to avoid dis-
crimination or sufficiently disconnected from the organization as to di-
minish the effects of discrimination. Because legislative reform may be
difficult to achieve, Part V offers an alternative solution to congressional
amendment: a nuanced but operational interpretation of the Court's
Clackamas opinion that would permit lower courts to define "employee"
broadly to include an inquiry into the vulnerability of the partner to dis-
crimination and the partner's dependence on the organization. This inter-
pretation is consistent with the language, values, and purposes of the anti-
discrimination statutes.
II. FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS: DEFINING "EMPLOYEES"
AND "EMPLOYERS"
A. DEFINITIONAL DILEMMAS
Federal civil rights laws prohibit workplace discrimination against per-
sons based on certain protected characteristics. These laws include Title
VII, which forbids employment discrimination because of race, color, re-
ligion, sex, or national origin, the ADEA, which prohibits discrimination
based on age over forty years; and the ADA, which outlaws discrimina-
tion because of a person's disability or relationship with a person with
disabilities. Except where there are differences in statutory language, the
courts generally interpret Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA in the
same manner, often using cases decided under one statute to support
analogous holdings under a different statute.1 5 This is particularly true
where the issue of coverage arises.16 The EEOC, the administrative body
15. See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 230 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (stat-
ing that the Supreme Court had not squarely addressed the applicability of the McDonnell
Douglas standard to the ADEA, but assuming its application); Stanziale v. Jargowsky, 200
F.3d 101, 105 (3d Cir. 2000) (ADEA and Title VII); Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope Co.,
108 F.3d 462, 464-65 (2d Cir. 1997) (ADEA); Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651 (5th Cir.
1996) (ADEA); Crawford v. Medina Gen. Hosp., 96 F.3d 830, 833-34 (6th Cir. 1996)
(ADEA); Ritter v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 58 F.3d 454, 456 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding that
Title VII standards apply to the ADEA); Pemrick v. Stracher, 67 F. Supp. 2d 149, 169 n.15
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that courts analyze ADEA and Title VII claims consistently).
16. See, e.g., Barnhart v. N.Y Life Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir. 1998) (con-
cluding that Darden's common-law definition of employer applies to the ADEA); EEOC
v. N. Knox Sch. Corp., 154 F.3d 744, 747 (7th Cir. 1998) (applying Darden's common-law
test to the ADEA); Swallows v. Barnes & Noble Book Stores, Inc., 128 F.3d 990, 993 n.2
(6th Cir. 1997) (concluding that because Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA define the
term "employer" in essentially the same way, it should rely on cases decided under all
three statutes in determining whether the defendant was the plaintiffs' employer under the
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with authority to write guidelines interpreting Title VII and the ADEA
and to promulgate regulations under Title I of the ADA, has concluded
that issues concerning coverage of Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA
should be interpreted in pari materia.17
For coverage by Title VII, the ADEA, and/or the ADA, the business
must classify as an "employer," defined under Title VII and the ADA as
''a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or
more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a
person. 18 The ADEA uses the same definition but requires twenty or
more employees over the same time period.19 These definitions of "em-
ployer" require an inquiry into how many employees a particular defen-
dant has, often raising the question in small companies of how to define
an "employee." This is precisely the issue raised in Clackamas, where the
plaintiff, Wells, a bookkeeper, who was clearly the "employee" of the
defendant professional corporation, sued alleging discrimination under
the ADA. While there was no doubt that the plaintiff was an "employee"
of the defendant, there was a question as to whether the defendant was
ADEA and the ADA); Speen v. Crown Clothing Corp., 102 F.3d 625, 631 (1st Cir. 1997)
(adopting the common-law agency test to define "employee" in ADEA cases, in light of
Darden); Carparts Dist. Ctr., Inc., v. Auto. Wholesaler's Ass'n of New Eng., Inc., 37 F.3d
12, 16 (1st Cir. 1994) (ADA); Kelly v. Wauconda Park Dist., 801 F.2d 269, 271-72 (7th Cir.
1986) (ADEA); Davis v. Calgon Corp., 627 F.2d 674, 676 (3d Cir. 1980) (ADEA); Healy v.
AIG Tech. Servs., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2001) (describing
the ADA and Title VII as "sister civil rights statutes"); Westphal v. Catch Ball Prods.,
Corp., 953 F. Supp. 475, 478 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that part-time employees are
"employees" for purposes of the ADEA if they are on the payroll for twenty or more
weeks per year); Garner v. Knoll Bros. Quick Marts, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1115, 1121 n.5
(N.D. Ind. 1997) (Title VII); Butler v. City of Prairie Vill., 961 F. Supp. 1470 (D. Kan. 1997)
(ADEA); Dejoy v. Comcast Cable Communications Inc., 941 F. Supp. 468, 473-74 (D. N.J.
1996) (concluding that courts treat ADEA, Title VII, and ADA cases interchangeably);
Whitchurch v. Apache Prods. Co., 916 F. Supp. 809, 812 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding no indi-
vidual liability in an ADEA case, relying on precedent in ADA case); Gardiner v. Dotson,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13412 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 19, 1994) (ADA); cf Beaulieu v. Northrop
Grumman Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1135 (D. Haw. 2000) (concluding that fact that plaintiff
was an employee of the staffing firm did not preclude his status as an employee of the
client firm in an ADA case).
17. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(a)-(f) (1999); EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, ENFORCE-
MENT GUIDANCE: APPLICATION OF EEO LAWS TO CONTINGENT WORKERS PLACED BY
TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES AND OTHER STAFFING FIRMS § 902, at 5480 n.10
(Dec. 3, 1997). Moreover, Title I of the ADA states that the "powers, remedies and proce-
dures" of Title VII shall apply to discrimination claims under Title I of the ADA. 42
U.S.C. § 12,117(a) (1994); Beaulieu, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1145 (citing to EEOC guidance and
concluding that fact that plaintiff was an employee of the staffing firm did not preclude his
status as an employee of the client firm in an ADA case).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(5)(A) (2000). Workers for em-
ployers having fewer than the minimum number of employees under these laws may be
protected against discrimination under other laws. For example, some state anti-discrimi-
nation laws do not limit the definition of "employer" to a business of a particular size.
Thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia require fewer than fifteen employees to
qualify as an employer under the anti-discrimination statute. See Ann C. McGinley, Fed-
eral Equal Employment Opportunities Law and Alternative Work Arrangements, in CON-
TINGENT AND OTHER ALTERNATIVE WORK ARRANGEMENTS (BNA) (forthcoming).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 630 (2000).
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an "employer" as defined by the ADA. Because the ADA requires fif-
teen employees for a person to be a covered "employer '20 and Clacka-
mas Gastroenterology had only fourteen employees in addition to the
four physician-shareholders who practiced medicine in the professional
corporation, coverage hinged on whether the physician-shareholders
were "employees" of the defendant Clackamas Gastroenterology. 2 1
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Clackamas, the answer
to this question was murky. The anti-discrimination statutes uniformly
define an "employee" as " an individual employed by an employer," 22 a
curiously ambiguous and circular definition that has created significant
problems for the courts. After the Supreme Court decided Clackamas,
the answer is still unclear, given the lack of direction the Court gave to
lower courts about how to weigh the factors in determining if a person is
an "employee."
A second difficult question arises as to coverage of the anti-discrimina-
tion statutes. Even when it is clear that a particular business enterprise is
an "employer" because it unquestionably employs the minimum number
of employees required by the statute, there often arises a question as to
whether a particular worker is covered by the statute. Because of the
ambiguity of the statutory language, the question of whether an individ-
ual is an "employee" who can sue the "employer" is thorny. Both Title
VII and the ADEA prohibit discrimination against an "individual" in hir-
ing, firing, and terms and conditions of employment, but do not define
the term "individual. '23 The ADA prohibits discrimination against a
20. I use the terms "employer," "covered employer," and "statutory employer" inter-
changeably throughout the article to refer to an employer who has the statutory minimum
number of employees to be covered by the statute in question.
21. Congress's choice to use the same definition of "employee" to determine who is a
covered worker under the acts and which firms are sufficiently large to be "employers" is
problematic. Much of the law is somewhat distorted because of this choice. Congress
would be better served to separate these definitions, counting as "employees" for purposes
of determining whether an employer is a covered employer all of those individuals who
regularly do work for the firm. The focus of this article is on whether partners themselves
should be covered and able to sue under the anti-discrimination laws.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 630(f); 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(4) (2000).
23. Title VII prohibits certain discriminatory practices:
(a) Employment practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individ-
ual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color relig-
ion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (2000) (emphasis added).
The relevant part of the ADEA states:
(a) Employment practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
[Vol. 57
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"qualified individual" with a disability, but does not define the term "in-
dividual." Courts have interpreted the word "individual" to mean em-
ployee or applicant for employment as opposed to independent
contractor,24 limiting coverage to those individuals with an employment
relationship, a prospective employment relationship, or a former em-
ployment relationship 25 with the statutory employer. Thus, the courts
have held uniformly that independent contractors are not "employees"
within the meaning of the anti-discrimination statutes. 26
While Clackamas involves the question of whether a business is an
"employer" for purposes of coverage under the ADA, it necessarily sets
the standards for determining whether to count a physician-shareholder
as an "employee" to see if the business meets the statutory minimum
number of employees for coverage under the ADA. Clackamas also es-
tablishes the test for deciding whether courts should count partners as
"employees" under the anti-discrimination acts.
Clackamas appears to provide a relatively simple answer to a series of
complex problems concerning the applicability of the anti-discrimination
laws: common-law principles of agency, as articulated in the Restatement
(Second) of Agency governing the master-servant relationship, with a
particular focus on the touchstone element of "control" will generally ap-
ply to determine whether a person is an "employee" under the anti-dis-
crimination acts. The Court instructed the lower courts to interpret the
common law through the lens of the EEOC Compliance Manual, which
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individ-
ual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's age.
29 U.S.C. § 623 (2000) (emphasis added).
The relevant part of the ADA states:
(a) General rule
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a dis-
ability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.
42 U.S.C. § 12,112(a) (2000).
24. See, e.g., Jenkins v. S. Farm Bureau Cas., 307 F.3d 741 (8th Cir. 2002) (ADEA);
Adcock v. Chrysler Corp., 166 F.3d 1290, 1292 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 816 (1999)
(Title VII); EEOC v. N. Knox Sch. Corp., 154 F.3d 744, 746 (7th Cir. 1998) (ADEA);
Devine v. Stone, Leyton, & Gershman, P.C., 100 F.3d 78 (8th Cir. 1996) (Title VII); Fran-
kel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 88-89 (2d Cir. 1993) (ADEA); Hayden v. La-Z-Boy Chair
Co., 9 F.3d 617, 619 (7th Cir. 1993) (ADEA); Daughtrey v. Honeywell, Inc., 3 F.3d 1488,
1495, n.13 (11th Cir. 1993) (ADEA); Diggs v. Harris Hosp.-Methodist, Inc., 847 F.2d 270,
273-74 (5th Cir. 1988) (Title VII); Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 339 (11th Cir.
1982) (Title VII). Independent contractors are covered by 42 U.S.C. § 1981, however,
which forbids race discrimination in contracting.
25. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997) (holding that former employees
can sue for retaliation under section 704(a) of Title VII).
26. See Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title
VII, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75 (1984).
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establishes a list of factors for making the determination. 2 7 This analysis
will not differ when the question is whether a person is an "employee" to
count towards the minimum number of employees required by a statu-
tory "employer," or whether the individual herself is an "employee" pro-
tected by the acts.
When determining whether shareholders in a PC are "employees," the
analysis focuses more narrowly on the questions pertinent to the specific
situation: for example, whether the individual collects compensation from
the profits of the organization or a salary, whether the individual has
power to control or manage his own work and the work of others, and
whether, and if so, to what extent, the individual participates in managing
the organization.
Although Clackamas advocates a simple "totality of the circumstances"
test for deciding who is an employee under the anti-discrimination acts,
approving the uniform application of the EEOC standards both to share-
holders and partners, the Court based its reasoning on faulty assumptions
made by previous courts and the EEOC. These assumptions are that ordi-
narily bona fide partners under state law who have all of the indicators of
a partnership relationship are not "employees" and that a person can
never classify as both an "employer" and an "employee."
B. HISTORY OF THE DEFINITIONS OF "EMPLOYEE" AND
"INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR"
When Congress passed Title VII in 1964, the Senate and House reports
defined the term "employee" "in the manner common for federal stat-
utes."'28 Because there was no common definition of the term in federal
statutes, this term is ambiguous. 2 9 Some earlier courts applied the com-
mon law "control test" to define an "employee," requiring that the em-
ployer control the means of accomplishing the work and the results
accomplished. 30 During the 1970s and the 1980s other courts adopted the
economic realities test,3 1 focusing on the economic dependence of the
worker on the business of the employer. 32 Still others modified the eco-
nomic realities approach for use in Title VII, creating a "hybrid" test.33
27. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assos. P.C v. Wells, 123 S. Ct. 1673, 1680 (2003).
28. See id. at 90 (citing H.R. 1370, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in EEOC, LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964, at 2155).
29. For an excellent description of the courts' historical approaches, see Lewis L.
Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond "Economic Realities": The Case for Amending Fed-
eral Employment Discrimination Laws to Include Independent Contractors, 38 B.C. L. REV.
239, 248-253 (1997).
30. See, e.g., Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 339-341 (11th Cir. 1982) (approv-
ing the use of a common-law approach that takes into account the "economic realities of
the relationship viewed in light of the common law," which focuses on the employer's right
to control, but does not consider the "economic realities with respect to the dependence of
the individual on the employment"); Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co., 410 F. Supp. 513, 516
(N.D. Cal. 1976), affd, 580 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1978).
31. See, e.g., Arbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983).
32. See id.
33. See, e.g., Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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The "hybrid" test centers primarily on the alleged employer's right to
control, but also takes into account additional factors such as:
(1) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether the work usu-
ally is done under the direction of a supervisor or is done by a spe-
cialist without supervision; (2) the skill required in the particular
occupation; (3) whether the "employer" or the individual in question
furnishes the equipment used and the place of work; (4) the length of
time during which the individual has worked; (5) the method of pay-
ment, whether by time or by the job; (6) the manner in which the
work relationship is terminated; i.e., by one or both parties, with or
without notice or explanation; (7) whether annual leave is afforded;
(8) whether the work is an integral part of the business of the "em-
ployer"; (9) whether the work accumulates retirement benefits; (10)
whether the "employer" pays social security taxes; and (11) the in-
tention of the parties.34
Even when ostensibly using the economic realities or the hybrid tests,
however, many courts rely almost exclusively on the employer's right to
control.35
In 1992, the Supreme Court decided Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.
v. Darden,36 a case brought under the Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act of 1974,37 ("ERISA"), holding that the common-law definition
of "employee" applies to determine whether a person is an employee
covered by ERISA or an independent contractor who is not covered.
The common-law definition, according to the Court in Darden, which re-
flects the "general common law of agency, rather than the law of any
particular State," 38 includes a consideration of:
the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which
the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to
this inquiry are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities
and tools, the location of the work, the duration of the relationship
between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign
additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's
discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment,
the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the
work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the
hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and
the tax treatment of the hired party.39
The definition of "employee" in ERISA is "any individual employed
by an employer." The Court noted that this definition "is completely cir-
34. Id. at 832.
35. See e.g., Broussard v. L.H. Bossier, Inc., 789 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1986) (invoking
the economic realities test but stating that the employer's right to control was the key
factor to consider in a Title VII case).
36. 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
37. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
38. Darden, 503 U.S. at 323 n.3 (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490
U.S. 730, 740 (1989)).
39. Id. at 323-24 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 751-52).
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cular and explains nothing, '40 and there were no other provisions in the
statute that would suggest that construing the statute in accordance with
traditional agency principles would thwart Congressional intent or lead to
"absurd results."'41 Darden quoted the broad language of Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,42 stating:
where Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning
under . . . the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute
otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the estab-
lished meaning of these terms .... In the past, when Congress used
the term 'employee' without defining it, we have concluded that
Congress intended to describe the conventional master-servant rela-
tionship as understood by common-law agency doctrine. 43
The EEOC applied Darden to Title VII, the ADEA and the ADA.44
Several lower courts also applied Darden to Title VII, holding that the
traditional agency principles define who is an "employee" for anti-dis-
crimination law purposes.45 This response is justifiable because the anti-
discrimination acts define "employee" in exactly the same manner as ER-
ISA and there is no other indication in the anti-discrimination acts that
the common law definition of "employee" would contravene the Con-
gressional purpose or lead to absurd results.
Because Darden does not address the question in Clackamas of
whether a physician-shareholder in a professional corporation is an em-
ployee under the ADA, it is not directly on point. However, Darden
figures prominently in the discussion concerning how to decide whether a
physician-shareholder is an "employee" because the definitions of "em-
ployee" under ERISA and the ADA are substantially identical.
Before discussing the applicability of Darden to Clackamas, the next
section lays the foundation for understanding Clackamas by analyzing the
relevant cases leading tip to the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari.
These include lower court cases concerning the question of whether part-
ners or shareholders in professional corporations are "employees." An
important related case decided by the Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether an associate in a law firm organized as a general
40. Id. at 323.
41. Id.
42. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
43. Darden, 503 U.S. at 322-23 (quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 739).
44. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: APPLICATION OF EEO
LAWS TO CONTINGENT WORKERS PLACED BY TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES AND
OTHER STAFFING FIRMS § 915.002 n.10 (Dec. 3, 1997).
45. See, e.g., Schwieger v. Farm Bureau Ins Co. of Neb., 207 F.3d 480, 482-84 (8th Cir.
2000) (applying Darden to Title VII case, but concluding that Darden requires a considera-
tion of many factors, including economic realities); O'Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112 (2d
Cir. 1997); Wilde v. County of Kandiyohi, 15 F.3d 103, 105 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying
Darden to Title VII case); cf Adcock v. Chrysler Corp., 166 F.3d 1290, 1292 n.3 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 816 (1999) (concluding that Darden would apply to Title VII cases
defining "employee" but using a slightly different test to determine whether an "employ-




partnership can sue the partnership for failing to admit her as a
member.46
III. PARTNERS AND SHAREHOLDERS: EMPLOYEES,
EMPLOYERS, OR BOTH?
A. BONA FIDE PARTNERS: EMPLOYEES OR EMPLOYERS?
After Congress passed the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the courts generally
assumed that the Act did not apply to the relationship between partners
in a general partnership.4 7 The relationship among partners was consid-
ered to be one among owners of the business, rather than an employment
relationship. For example, in Burke v. Friedman,48 the Seventh Circuit,
employing sparse analysis, concluded that a partner in a public account-
ing partnership could not be considered an "employee" under Title VII
for purposes of determining whether the defendant firm was a statutory
employer. While acknowledging that partnerships are covered "employ-
ers" under the Act,4 9 the court looked at language from three internal
revenue cases and the Uniform Partnership Act, which defined a partner-
ship as "an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners
of a business for profits."'50 These definitions, according to the court, ex-
cluded partners in general partnerships as "employees" because they are
"employers who own and manage the operation of the business. ' 51
After Burke, in Hishon v. King & Spalding,52 the Supreme Court de-
cided the question of whether Title VII governs a law firm's refusal to
invite a female associate to join the partnership. The plaintiff was hired
in 1972, as an associate of a large law firm organized as a general partner-
ship. 53 The partners denied her admission to the partnership in 1978 and
1979.54 After filing a charge with the EEOC, she sued, alleging that the
defendant had discriminated against her on the basis of her sex, thus vio-
lating Title VII.55 The federal district court dismissed the complaint, con-
cluding that Title VII did not govern the refusal to admit an associate into
a partnership.5 6 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed by a divided court. 57
In an unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that
once parties establish a contractual relationship of employment, Title VII
46. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
47. See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir. 1982); Burke v.
Friedman, 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977); Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp.
123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (assuming arguendo that partners are not covered by Title VII).
48. 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977).
49. Id. at 869 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000)).
50. Id. (quoting UNIF. P'SHip. Ac-r § 6 (1914)).
51. Id. at 869.
52. 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
53. Id. at 71.
54. Id. at 72.
55. Id.
56. Id.; Hishon v. King & Spalding, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16179 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
57. Hishon, 678 F.2d 1002.
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attaches to govern aspects of the relationship. 58 The Court held that Title
VII's prohibition of sex discrimination in the "terms, conditions or privi-
leges of employment" applies to the decision of whether to offer an asso-
ciate partnership status. The Court noted that the complaint alleged that
the plaintiff had a contractual relationship with the defendant to be con-
sidered for partner on a "fair and equal basis." Furthermore, the Court
observed that even if there were not a contractual right concerning partic-
ular benefits, an employer would violate Title VII by choosing to confer
privileges in a way that discriminated against an employee on the basis of
membership in a protected group. 59 The Court noted that there were
several allegations in the complaint supporting the conclusion that the
opportunity to become a partner at the law firm was "part and parcel of
an associate's status as an employee at respondent's firm, independent of
any allegation that such an opportunity was included in associates' em-
ployment contracts. ' 60 These allegations included the partnership's use
of the opportunity to gain partnership as a recruiting tool and the termi-
nation of associates who did not become partners.61
King & Spalding argued that because elevation to partnership entails a
change in status from an "employee" to an "employer," advance to part-
nership never qualifies as a "term, condition or privilege of employment."
The Court responded, "even if respondent is correct that a partnership
invitation is not itself an offer of employment, Title VII would nonethe-
less apply and preclude discrimination on the basis of sex. The benefit a
plaintiff is denied need not be employment to fall within Title VII's pro-
tection; it need only be a term, condition, or privilege of employment. '62
The Court also rejected King & Spalding's claim that Title VII exempts
partnership decisions, noting that the defendant could point to nothing in
the statute or the legislative history that would support such a per se
exemption. 63
Finally, the Court summarily dismissed King & Spalding's claim that
application of Title VII would infringe upon the constitutional rights of
expression or association, noting that although lawyers may contribute to
the society's ideas, the defendant had not shown how Title VII's require-
ment that the plaintiff be considered on her merits for partnership inhib-
ited the partners' ability to fulfill this function. The Court stated,
"[invidious] private discrimination may be characterized as a form of ex-
ercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it
has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections. ' 64
58. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 74.
59. Id. at 75.
60. Id. at 76.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 77.
63. Id. at 77 n.10.




In an oft-quoted concurring opinion, Justice Powell argued that the
Court's opinion "should not be read as extending Title VII to the man-
agement of a law firm by its partners. ' 65 He opined that the majority
opinion does not "require" that the relationship among partners be con-
sidered an "employment relationship to which Title VII would apply."'66
He argued that the relationship among law partners differs significantly
from that between employers and employees because partners make
many sensitive decisions by consent:67
These decisions concern such matters as participation in profits and
other types of compensation; work assignments; approval of commit-
ments in bar association, civic, or political activities; questions of bill-
ing; acceptance of new clients; questions of conflicts of interest;
retirement programs; and expansion policies. Such decisions may af-
fect each partner of the firm. Divisions of partnership profits, unlike
shareholders' rights to dividends, involve judgments as to each part-
ner's contribution to the reputation and success of the firm. This is
true whether the partner's participation in profits is measured in
terms of points or percentages, combinations of salaries and points,
salaries and bonuses, and possibly in other ways.68
Justice Powell defined the "essence" of a law partnership as the "com-
mon conduct of a shared enterprise. '69 He conceded, however, that an
employer may not evade Title VII simply by labeling employees as "part-
ners" if they do not bear the markers of bona fide partners under state
law.70
Finally, Justice Powell qualified the Court's rejection of the defendant's
argument that its constitutional right to association protects its choice of
partners. Agreeing that the contract was enforceable because it was an
obligation voluntarily assumed, Powell concluded that Title VII may im-
pede the "exercise of personal judgment in choosing one's associates or
colleagues. Impediments to the exercise of one's right to choose one's
associates can violate the right of association protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. 71
After Hishon, lower courts split in their analysis of whether a partner is
an "employee" for anti-discrimination law purposes. Although the unan-
imous opinion of the Court in Hishon permits, if not requires, that courts
consider a partner to have an employment relationship with the partner-
ship, many lower courts adopted Justice Powell's reasoning, holding that
the relationship between a partner and the partnership is not covered by
the anti-discrimination statutes.72 These courts, rather than analyzing the
65. Id. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 79-80.
68. Id. at 80 n.3.
69. Id. at 79-80.
70. Id. at 80 n.2.
71. Id. at 80 n.4 (citations omitted).
72. See 1 LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 4.03 (2d ed. 1994).
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broad possibilities of the majority Supreme Court opinion in Hishon, fo-
cus on Justice Powell's statement that Hishon does not imply that part-
ners are "employees" under Title VII. Like Justice Powell, they
recognize a narrow exception to the general rule that partners are not
"employees." They conclude that only individuals wrongfully labeled as
partners who do not possess the indicators of a bona fide partner under
state law are employees for anti-discrimination law purposes. These in-
dicators include a share in the profits, liability for debts of the partner-
ship, and some management or control of the partnership. This formalist
approach does not permit a searching inquiry into the power relation-
ships among the partners or between the partners and the partnership
itself.73 In fact, an examination of state law and the partnership agree-
ment alone may suffice to conclude that a partner is bona fide and, conse-
quently, not an "employee."
Other courts apply the "economic realities" test to determine whether
the partners in a partnership are, in fact, "employees." This test differs
somewhat from the economic realities test previously used to decide
whether a worker is an independent contractor or an employee. In the
independent contractor-employee cases, courts look closely at the depen-
dence of the individual on the job in question for his or her economic
well-being, a factor that would serve to separate workers who are true
"independent" contractors from those who are employees of the busi-
ness. Under the "economic realities" test as used to distinguish between
partners who are "employees" and those who are not, courts focus on the
relationship among the partners. This test considers the amount of power
an individual partner actually has to formulate policy and make decisions
in the partnership.74 This approach ordinarily emphasizes the political
power the partner enjoys, which is defined as the right to vote and to sit
on partnership committees; however, this approach ignores the social and
economic power or powerlessness of the individual.
Recently, the EEOC took a middle ground between these two ap-
proaches. While its position is closer to the economic realities test, it be-
gins with a presumption against a partner's employee status. The EEOC
published a guidance concerning the coverage of partners, officers, mem-
bers of boards of directors, and major shareholders. The guidance states:
In most circumstances, individuals who are partners, officers, mem-
bers of boards of directors, or major shareholders will not qualify as
employees. An individual's title, however, does not determine
whether the individual is a partner, officer, member of a board of
directors, or major shareholder, as opposed to an employee. The in-
vestigator should determine whether the individual acts indepen-
dently and participates in managing the organization, or whether the
73. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1987); EEOC v. Sidley
Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 708-712 (7th Cir. 2002) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
74. See e.g., Strother v. So. Cal. Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1996), amended by,




individual is subject to the organization's control. If the individual is
subject to the organization's control, s/he is an employee. The follow-
ing factors should be considered:
Whether the organization can hire or fire the individual or set the
rules and regulations of the individual's work;
Whether and, if so, to what extent the organization supervises the
individual's work;
Whether the individual reports to someone higher in the
organization;
Whether, and, if so, to what extent the individual is able to influence
the organization;
Whether the parties intended that the individual be an employee, as
expressed in written agreements or contracts; and
Whether the individual shares in the profits, losses, and liabilities of
the organization. 75
All three tests-the "economic realities," the bona fide partner, and
the EEOC test-presume non-employee status for most partners, treat-
ing partners as employees as an exception to the general rule. The Su-
preme Court in Clackamas implicitly accepted this premise as the
foundation for its opinion.
In Wheeler v. Hurdman,76 the Tenth Circuit, relying on Justice Powell's
concurrence in Hishon, held that a partner in a large public accounting
firm could not sue the firm for age discrimination because she was not an
"employee." 77
The Tenth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's and the EEOC's litigation po-
sition that the court should consider the economic realities test or the
"domination" theory to determine Ms. Wheeler was an "employer"
rather than an "employee." Instead, the court emphasized the nature of
partnerships, the difficulty in applying a case by case test and the failure
of Congress to clarify that general partners are "employees. '78 It con-
cluded that looking at "economic realities," defined as dependence on the
business, makes little sense in the partnership context. Whereas the "eco-
nomic realities" test may appropriately distinguish between an indepen-
dent contractor and an employee because the test demonstrates who is
part of the firm and who is conducting a separate business, it should not
decide which general partners are "employees" because all partners will
be dependent on the firm business.79 According to the Tenth Circuit, the
domination test is also nonsensical because domination can occur for a
number of practical reasons by agreement in a partnership by giving up
control to a particular group or person to make decisions for the rest of
the partners. 80 Other characteristics the court saw as distinguishing part-
75. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 2-III(A)(1) (May 12, 2001) (citations omitted),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/compliance.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2003).
76. 825 F.2d 257 (10th Cir.1987).
77. Id. at 265.
78. Id. at 275-76.
79. Id. at 272.
80. Id. at 274.
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nerships are the profit sharing, contributions to capital, part ownership of
partnership assets, and the right to share in management subject to
agreement. 81
Furthermore, the court argued, partnerships are different from other
business forms because employees do not assume the risks of losses and
liabilities of their employers as partners do for their partners.8 2
Finally, the court criticized the EEOC's argument in the case that part-
ners who are not powerful enough to prevent discrimination against
themselves are "employees." This test, the court concluded, is entirely
too liberal, a test that would sweep almost all partners in even the small-
est partnerships into the purview of the anti-discrimination statutes. 83
Furthermore, the court opined, if this were the test to distinguish inde-
pendent contractors from employees, many independent contractors
would be protected by the statute. 84 While Congress could choose to
amend the statute to expand its coverage in this way, the Tenth Circuit
declined to expand the coverage of the Act.8 5 The only exception that
the court saw for coverage of a "partner" was the narrow exception men-
tioned by Justice Powell in Hishon. If the partnership labeled persons
who were truly "employees" as partners in order to escape coverage of
the anti-discrimination acts, the mislabeled partners may be employees
under the acts.86
Another example of this narrow approach to defining partners as em-
ployees is Judge Easterbrook's concurring opinion in EEOC v. Sidley
Austin Brown & Wood.87 The concurrence, which is described more fully
below, 88 asserted that partners are bona fide and therefore not employees
simply if they share in the profits, are liable for debts, and have certain
management control, as defined by state law. Judge Easterbrook refused
to consider as "employees" those partners he defined as bona fide who,
due to a strong self-perpetuating executive committee, in reality, have no
power in the organization.
The Ninth Circuit took a more functional approach in Strother v.
Southern California Permanente Medical Group.89 Strother, an African
American female medical doctor, was a partner of a 2,000 member part-
nership. After the defendant relieved her of many of her duties, the plain-
tiff sued, alleging that the partnership discriminated against her on the
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 275.
84. Id.
85. See also Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir.
1986) (concluding that partners in a general partnership are not "employees" and holding
that physician-shareholders should be treated as employees); Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima &
Co., P.A., 925 F.2d 1398, 1400 (11th Cir. 1991) (assuming that a bona fide partner in a
general partnership is not an employee).
86. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79-80 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring).
87. 315 F.3d 696, 708-12 (7th Cir. 2002).
88. See infra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
89. 79 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1996), amended by, reh'g denied, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS
13202 (June 3, 1996).
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basis of her race and sex in violation of the California Fair Employment
and Housing Act (FEHA).90 The lower court dismissed the complaint,
concluding that, by virtue of her membership in the partnership, the
plaintiff was not an "employee" under the FEHA.91
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit looked to the ADEA and Title VII for
guidance because there was little California law concerning the definition
of an "employee. ' 92 It concluded that the federal district court had erred
in granting the defendant's motion to dismiss because the determination
typically requires a factual inquiry that goes beyond the label of partner
and the partnership agreement itself.93 The court further stated that:
Courts must analyze the true relationship among the partners, in-
cluding the method of compensation, the "partner's" responsibility
for partnership liabilities, and the management structure and the
"partner's" role in that management, to determine if an individual
should be treated as a partner or an employee for the purpose of
employment discrimination laws. 94
Although the Seventh Circuit had applied a formalist approach in
Burke,95 in Sidley Austin,96 Judge Posner, writing for two members of a
three judge panel, adopted a functional approach to decide whether a
partner is an "employee" under the ADEA. In Sidley Austin, the EEOC
investigated whether the demotion of 32 of the law firm's equity partners
to "counsel" or "senior counsel" violated the ADEA.97 The EEOC is-
sued a subpoena duces tecum to the firm, seeking documentation con-
cerning the issues of whether the partners are "employees" covered by
the ADEA and whether the partnership discriminated against them be-
cause of their age.98 The lower court ordered the law firm to comply to
the subpoena in full. 99 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit vacated the lower
court's ruling and remanded to direct the law firm to comply with the part
of the subpoena related to coverage. Once the firm completes its submis-
sions of these documents, the Seventh Circuit stated, the lower court
should determine whether the demoted partners are "arguably" "employ-
ees" under the ADEA. a00 If the lower court concludes that it is "plain on
90. CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 12,900-12,996 (Deering 2003).
91. Strother v. So. Cal. Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 1996).
92. See id. at 866.
93. Id. at 867; cf Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 440-41, 443 n.2 (6th Cir.
1996) (holding that a partner in a large public accounting firm was an employee for pur-
poses of ADEA coverage despite his liability on firm debts because he had no authority to
direct or participate in the admission or discharge of firm personnel, to participate in deter-
mining the compensation of personnel, including partners, to participate in the vote for
chairman or the members of the management committee or to participate in the firm's
profits).
94. 79 F.3d at 867.
95. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
96. 315 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2002).
97. Id. at 698.
98. Id.
99. See EEOC v. Sidley & Austin, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2113 (N.D. I11. Feb. 11,
2002).
100. Sidley Austin, 315 F.3d at 707.
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the basis of uncontested facts" that the thirty-two partners were not "em-
ployees" for purposes of the ADEA, the lower court should excuse the
firm from complying with the portion of the subpoena requesting docu-
ments that are relevant to the merits of the discrimination claim.10 1
In guiding the federal district court in its decision, Judge Richard Pos-
ner advocated a functional approach that considers the power of the part-
ners within the law firm and eschews the automatic consideration of the
partner's liability for the firm's debts.10 2 This approach departs signifi-
cantly from that expressed in the opinions in Burke and Wheeler. It chas-
tises the parties for not briefing the reasons why some or all partners
should be deemed employers and therefore not covered by anti-discrimi-
nation acts.103 The opinion concluded that it is not inconsistent for a
partner to be an "employee" even if the partner is an equity partner in a
general partnership. The question, Judge Posner noted, is not whether the
person is a "partner," but whether the person is an "employer. '10 4
Judge Posner noted that Sidley & Austin is a large firm of more than
500 partners all of whose power resides in a 36 member unelected execu-
tive committee. 10 5 The executive committee is self-perpetuating-its
members elect the subsequent committees.10 6 While the executive com-
mittee delegates some powers to partners who are not members of the
committee with respect to hiring, firing, promotion, and compensation of
subordinates, these non-executive committee member partners are "at
the committee's mercy. It can fire them, promote them, demote them (as
it did to the 32), raise their pay, lower their pay, and so forth. '10 7 The
executive committee set the incomes of the 32 partners as well. While
each of the 32 partners served on other firm committees, all of the com-
mittees are subject to the control of the executive committee.10 8 The
court stated that the only firm-wide vote taken within the past 25 years
occurred when the partnership merged with Brown & Wood, a vote that
occurred after the EEOC began its investigation into the firm for viola-
tions of the ADEA.10 9
As evidence of the partners' "employer" status, Sidley & Austin argued
that partners can bind the firm to contracts, share in the profits of the
firm, participate in committees, and own some of the firm's capital.110
Judge Posner dismissed these arguments stating that upper level manag-
101. Id. The corollary also would appear to be true. If the lower court finds that the 32
partners are arguably employees, presumably, it will order that the firm comply with the
remaining portions of the subpoena. This order would be a final order and appealable to
the Seventh Circuit. Id.
102. Id. at 702-04.
103. See id. at 701-02.
104. Id. at 702.
105. Id. at 702-03.




110. Id. at 703.
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ers in corporations have the same power to bind the corporation to con-
tracts, serve on comparable administrative committees, and often own
company stock;III no one doubts that these managers are "employees."
Posner found unconvincing Sidley's contention that the partnership
agreement delegated the partnership's power to the executive commit-
tee. 12 The "most partneresque" feature of these partners' relationship to
the firm, concluded Judge Posner, is that they have unlimited liability for
the firm's debts.'1 3 If the implicit reason, however, for holding that the
ADEA does not apply to employers is that employers have sufficient
power to avoid, or adequate remedies to redress, discrimination, he rea-
soned, unlimited liability cannot be the determinative measure for decid-
ing who is an employee and who is an employer. 1 14 The issue of liability
for partnership debts, according to Judge Posner, "illustrates the impor-
tance of referring the question of whether a partner in a particular firm is
an employer or an employee to statutory purpose." 11 5
As mentioned above, Judge Easterbrook concurred, 11 6 stating that the
only issue is whether an individual is a bona fide partner.' 1 7 According to
Judge Easterbrook, a bona fide partner shares the risk, receives profits, is
liable for the firm's debts, and is a member of a partnership whose agree-
ment concords with state law.11 8 A partner would not be bona fide if the
individual did not possess these characteristics." 9
Judge Easterbrook concluded that the 32 Sidley & Austin partners are
bona fide partners because they share in the profits, have capital accounts
at risk, and are personally liable for the firm's debts,120 even though they
have no management control or power within the organization. He also
noted that no non-partner has an equity interest in the firm.121
B. SHAREHOLDERS IN PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS: FORM
OR FUNCTION?
In EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd.,122 the Seventh Circuit held that law-
yer-shareholders of a PC should not be counted as "employees" to deter-
mine whether the defendant met the statutory minimum of 15 employees




114. Id. at 704.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 708 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 709.
118. Id. at 710.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 709.
121. Id. He concurs in the majority's judgment because he is uncertain as to whether
there are lawyers other than the 32 in the firm who are labeled "partners" but who actually
do not possess the characteristics of the bona fide partner and who should be treated as
employees under the ADEA. Id.
122. 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984).
123. 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977).
2004]
SMU LAW REVIEW
Seventh Circuit held, before Hishon, that partners in an accounting firm
were not "employees" under Title VII because partners manage and con-
trol a business as employers and share in its profits. 124 The court in
Dowd rejected the EEOC's arguments that Burke was distinguishable be-
cause it related to the question of whether a partner in a partnership is an
employee, not whether a shareholder in a PC is an "employee." The
court concluded that the distinction between a shareholder and a partner
was of "little value" under Title VII because the roles played by a share-
holder and a partner are similar to one another and considerably differ-
ent from the role played by shareholders in general corporations.1 2 5 It
noted that shareholders in a PC are not immune from liability for mal-
practice of the other shareholders and the management, control and own-
ership of the corporation is much like that of a partnership.12 6
In contrast, in Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assoc., P.C.,1 27 the
Second Circuit held that a physician-shareholder in a PC who brought
suit against the PC alleging age discrimination was an "employee" pro-
tected by the ADEA. The court reasoned that although it was generally
accepted that partners are "employers" rather than "employees," courts
should not ignore the voluntarily chosen form of business organization
selected by the shareholders in a PC. The Second Circuit openly dis-
agreed with the Seventh Circuit in Dowd, holding that "the use of a cor-
porate form precludes any examination designed to determine whether
the entity is in fact a partnership. 1 128 Moreover, the Second Circuit
noted that while the "economic realities" test may be appropriate for dis-
tinguishing an employee from an independent contractor, this test should
not apply in an attempt to identify an "employee" of a PC as a partner
and manager.12 9 There was no question, according to the court, that the
plaintiff was an "employee" because he was an officer and shareholder
of the corporation and was specifically designated an "employee" in the
employment agreement signed with the corporation that described the
terms and conditions of his employment. 130
124. Id. at 869.
125. Dowd, 736 F.2d at 1178.
126. Id.; cf. Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Co., P.A., 925 F.2d 1398, 1399 (11th Cir. 1991)
(holding that a member/shareholder of a professional association was as a matter of law
not an employee under the ADEA because Fountain owned 31% of the firm's stock; was
referred to as a partner by clients and employees and each other; shared final authority and
responsibility in firm's operation; shared in the firm's profits, losses, and expenses; was
compensated based on a share of the profits; was jointly and severally liable for certain
debts; and had a right to vote on firm matters).
127. 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986).
128. Id. at 798.
129. Id. The dissent agreed with the other two members of the panel on this point but
reached a different conclusion about whether the form of the business should determine
whether a person is an employee under the ADEA. Id. at 801 (Cardamone, J., dissenting)
(concluding that the only two factors that should be considered are compensation and con-





C. CLACKAMAS GASTROENTEROLOGY ASSOCIATES, P.C. V. WELLS1 3 '
In Clackamas, the Ninth Circuit followed Hyland v. New Haven Radi-
ology Associates, P.C. and disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's opinion in
EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, concluding that physicians who practice
medicine as shareholders and directors of a PC count as "employees" for
purposes of determining whether the professional corporation is a statu-
tory employer under the ADA.132 The plaintiff, Deborah Anne Wells, a
bookkeeper for eleven years with the defendant, sued, alleging that the
defendant had violated Title I of the ADA, which prohibits discrimina-
tion because of a person's disability. The defendant filed a motion for
summary judgment arguing that it was not covered by the ADA because
it was not a statutory employer. Both sides agreed that there would be
sufficient employees for ADA coverage only if the physicians who were
the shareholders of the PC were counted as "employees" for coverage
purposes. 133 The federal district court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment, affirming the report and recommendation of the fed-
eral magistrate. 134 The magistrate considered the "true relationship
among the individuals, including the method of compensation, the re-
sponsibility for the entity's liabilities, and the management structure and
role in that management, to determine if an individual should be treated
as an 'employee' under the employment discrimination laws."'1 35 He con-
cluded that the four doctors were "employers" of the defendant PC
rather than "employees," 136 "more analogous to partners in a partnership
than to shareholders in a general corporation."1 37
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that profession-
als who make the voluntary choice to practice under the structure of a
professional corporation are "employees." The Ninth Circuit panel' 38
noted that the doctors who had chosen the corporate form over a part-
nership in order to achieve favorable tax treatment and limited civil lia-
bility could not deny that they were "employees" for purposes of
coverage of the employment discrimination statutes.1 39 The court stated
that during the relevant time period the physician-shareholders had "ac-
tively participated in the management and operation of the medical prac-
tice and literally were employees of the corporation under employment
131. 123 S. Ct. 1673 (2003).
132. Wells v. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C., 271 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir.
2001).
133. See 123 S. Ct. 1673 (2003).
134. Wells v. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8574
(D. Or. May 5, 2000).
135. Wells v. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8590,
*10 (D. Or. Mar. 22, 2000).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. There was one dissenting opinion that advocated following the Seventh Circuit
approach. See Wells v. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C., 271 F.3d 903, 906-909
(9th Cir. 2001) (Graber, J., dissenting).
139. See Wells, 271 F.3d at 905.
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agreements. '1 40 Given the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the physician-
shareholders were "employees" of the defendant, the defendant had the
statutory minimum number of "employees" for purposes of coverage of
the ADA and the plaintiff's case could go forward.141 The Supreme
Court granted Clackamas' petition for a writ of certiorari.142
1. Arguments Made by the Parties
As explained in Part II.B above, Darden held that common-law princi-
ples should fill the gap left by ERISA's ambiguous definition of "em-
ployee." If Darden were controlling in Clackamas because of a similarly
vague definition of "employee" in the ADA, we would expect the Su-
preme Court to apply agency principles to determine whether the physi-
cian-shareholders are "employees" of the PC. In fact, it appears that if
the Restatement (Second) of Agency definition were applied to the fact
pattern in Clackamas, the physician-shareholders may well be classified
as "employees" of the professional corporation because the physician-
shareholders were bound by an employment agreement with the corpora-
tion that established control over their activities. 143 The Restatement
(Second) of Agency section 2 defines the difference between a master-
servant relationship and that between a person and an independent
contractor:
(1) A master is a principal who employs an agent 144 to perform service
in his affairs and who controls or has the right to control the physi-
cal conduct of the other in the performance of the service.
(2) A servant is an agent employed by a master to perform service in
his affairs whose physical conduct in the performance of the service
is controlled or is subject to the right to control by the master.
(3) An independent contractor is a person who contracts with another
to do something for him but who is not controlled by the other nor
subject to the other's right to control with respect to his physical
conduct in the performance of the undertaking. He may or may not
be an agent.
The Restatement (Second) of Agency defines a servant as:
(1) A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of
another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the per-
formance of the services is subject to the other's control or right to
control.
140. Id. at 906.
141. Id.
142. See 536 U.S. 990 (2002).
143. Clackamas, 123 S. Ct. at 1681 n.11 (citing J.A. 66, Tr. of Oral Arg. at 8).
144. The Restatement defines agency, principal, and agent as:
(1) Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of
consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf
and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.
(2) The one for whom action is to be taken is the principal.
(3) The one who is to act is the agent.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).
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(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an
independent contractor, the following matters of fact, among
others, are considered:
a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may
exercise over the details of the work;
b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occu-
pation or business:
c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the local-
ity, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer
or by a specialist without supervision;
d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumen-
talities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the
work;
f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
h) whether or not the work is part of the regular business of the
employer;
i) whether or not the parties believe that they are creating the rela-
tion of master and servant; and
j) whether the principal is or is not in business.145
The Reporter's comments make it clear that the term "servant" is not
limited to a person who performs manual labor. Instead, it states:
One who performs continuous service for another and who, as to his
physical movements, is subject to the control or to the right to con-
trol of the other as to the manner of performing the service. The
word indicates the closeness of the relation between the one giving
and the one receiving the service rather than the nature of the ser-
vice or the importance of the one giving it. Thus, ship captains and
managers of great corporations are normally superior servants, dif-
fering only in the dignity and importance of their positions from
those working under them. 146
Factors in Clackamas such as corporate structure, the employment
agreement between the corporation and the physicians, the requirement
that physicians follow work standards established by the corporation,
their work location on premises leased or owned by the corporation and
their reporting, at least for some purposes, to the personnel director indi-
cate that they were "servants" under the Restatement.14 7
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220.
146. Id. § 220 cmt. a.
147. Clackamas, 123 S. Ct. at 1681-83 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the physi-
cian-shareholders most likely fit the Restatement definition of "servant" because they pro-
vide services on behalf of the corporation, have employment contracts with the
corporation, receive salaries and bonuses pursuant to the contracts, work at the clinic facil-
ities owned or leased by the corporation, and must abide the standards established by the
corporation in their work).
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The petitioner, Clackamas Gastroenterology, argued to the Supreme
Court, however, that common law, as modified by the EEOC guide-
lines, 148 should apply to determine whether the physician-shareholders
are "employees" of the corporation. This modification is necessary, the
petitioner argued, to assure consistency between the treatment of part-
ners in general and limited partnerships, and shareholders in PCs.
At oral argument before the Supreme Court, the petitioner acknowl-
edged that directors who work for a general corporation are considered
"servants" of the corporation. The petitioner argued that because the
Darden factors were designed to determine the difference between an
"employee" and an independent contractor, many of the factors do not fit
to distinguish "partners" from "employees." Instead, the petitioner ar-
gued that Darden needs modification because when the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Agency was written in 1958, the professional corporation did not
exist. Clackamas Gastroenterology is a PC whose structure and relation-
ships are identical to those of a partnership; therefore, petitioner argued,
it shduld be treated as a partnership. The petitioner argued that the
EEOC guidance, which examines the factors relevant to the inquiry of
whether a partner or shareholder in a PC is an "employee" under Title
VII, the ADEA and the ADA, provides an appropriate modification of
Darden in this area. 149
The United States participated in the oral argument as amicus curiae. It
urged the Court to follow the EEOC standards. According to the
Government:
The EEOC started with the common, common (sic) law right to con-
trol test that is used to distinguish between independent contractors
and employees and adapted it to make a distinction between those
who were the proprietors of the business and that business' employ-
ees, and it did so in a way to align its standards for looking at the
question of shareholder-director with the same standards that have
been used by all the courts in deciding whether partners . . . are
employees. 150
Like the petitioner, the United States justified this departure from
Darden because Darden decided a different question: the standard for
determining the difference between an "employee" and an "independent
contractor." Before Darden, the Court had twice interpreted broadly the
term "employee" in federal statutes. Congress had overruled the Court's
broad interpretations legislatively to narrow the interpretation of the
term to exclude independent contractors. Thus, in Darden, the Court cau-
tiously limited the interpretation of the term "employee" to its common-
law definition. Absent that specific history, however, the United States
argued, the Court has recognized the purposes of statutes in interpreting
148. 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL §§ 605:0008-605:00010 (2000).
149. See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 2003 U.S. TRANS. LEXIS
13, *1-13 (Feb. 25, 2003).
150. Id. at *6.
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terms in the statutes and their applications. The United States urged the
Court to consider the EEOC's approach which uses the common-law def-
inition of control as the base, but which additionally recognizes the pur-
poses of defining "employees" in a particular way. One Supreme Court
Justice asked counsel for the United States whether a person could be an
"employer" for some purposes and an "employee" for others. His imme-
diate response was, "no," stating that the EEOC guidance requires the
court to make an "overall judgment" after considering the factors as to
whether a person is an "employer" or an "employee." The Government's
counsel did not explain why the EEOC standards do not permit a dual
role.151 This failure is fatal to the government's argument concerning the
classification of partners for purposes of the anti-discrimination laws. As
I will demonstrate below, partners can and do act both as employers and
employees of the partnership. In fact, this dual role is obvious from the
language of the statute. 152
The respondent argued that even under the limited Skidmore v. Swift
& Co. 153 deference to the EEOC guidance, the guidance must fail be-
cause it is unreasonable. As the guidance attempts to correct the inconsis-
tency of treating partners and shareholders differently, it creates another
inconsistency that counters the purposes of the ADA. A professional
corporation with only one shareholder and 14 employees and one with 14
shareholders and 14 employees would be treated the same even though
one business would have only 15 workers and the other would have 28
workers. Thus, respondent argued, the defendant-petitioner Clackamas,
should be held to the form of corporation it voluntarily selected. Because
the physicians chose to form a PC in order to limit their personal liability
and to create favorable treatment under the tax laws, they should not be
permitted to deny that they are "employees" under the ADA. This es-
toppel argument is powerful, but while it may have resolved Clackamas,
it does nothing to determine which partners should be considered em-
ployees for purposes of the anti-discrimination acts. In fact, it may con-
ceivably be used to conclude that no partners are covered employees
under the acts.
2. The Supreme Court Opinions
In Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells the Supreme
Court addressed the conflict between the Second and the Ninth Cir-
cuits. 154 The Court rejected the petitioner's claim that the answer to the
151. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 2003 WL 840129, *17-18 (U.S.
Oral Arg. Feb. 25, 2003).
152. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
153. 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). The Supreme Court in Clackamas held that the EEOC
Compliance Manual was a "'body of experience and informed judgment"' to which it
could resort for guidance. 123 S. Ct. at 1680 n.9 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
154. 123 S. Ct. 1673, 1677 (2003). The Court noted that other circuits besides the Sec-
ond, Seventh, and Ninth had conflicting opinions with regard to this question. Id. (noting
that the Eighth Circuit had dealt with this issue as well).
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question of whether a shareholder of a PC lies in the determination of
whether the shareholder acts more as a "partner" and less like a share-
holder in a general corporation. 155 Instead, the Court noted that there
are many large partnerships in which the partners would qualify as "em-
ployees" for purposes of the anti-discrimination acts. "Thus, asking
whether shareholder-directors are partners-rather than asking whether
they are employees-simply begs the question."' 156 The Court also re-
jected the formalist reasoning of the Ninth Circuit. The Supreme Court
focused on two points. First, the congressional purpose in setting a statu-
tory minimum number of employees in order for the "employer" to be
covered was a legislative decision to protect small firms' ability to com-
pete with larger firms and give easy entry into markets. 157 Second, the
Court stated that the congressional silence concerning the meaning of
"employee" under the Act "often reflects an expectation that courts will
look to the common law to fill gaps in statutory text, particularly when an
undefined term has a settled meaning at common law."'158
With these two points in mind, the Court noted that despite the nonex-
istence of professional corporations at common law, the common-law
definition of the master-servant relationship, especially its focus on con-
trol of the master over the servant, provides helpful guidance in
Clackamas.159
The Court approved of the EEOC standards concerning the broad
question of who is an "employee" under the anti-discrimination laws and
the narrower question of when partners, officers, members of boards of
directors, and major shareholders qualify as employees under the stat-
utes.160 The Court found persuasive the EEOC list of factors to consider
in determining the specific issue of whether a shareholder-director is an
"employee." 16'
Agreeing with the EEOC that the list is not necessarily "'exhaustive,"'
and that the answer to the question of whether a shareholder-director is
155. Id. at 1678.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1678-79.
158. Clackamas, 123 S. Ct. at 1679 (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S.
318 (1992)).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1679-80.
161. Those six factors include:
Whether the organization can hire or fire the individual or set the rules and
regulations of the individual's work
Whether and, if so, to what extent the organization supervises the individ-
ual's work
Whether the individual reports to someone higher in the organization
Whether and, if so, to what extent the individual is able to influence the
organization
Whether the parties intended that the individual be an employee, as ex-
pressed in written agreements or contracts
Whether the individual shares in the profits, losses, and liabilities of the
organization.
Id. at 1680 (quoting EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 605:0009 (2000)).
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an "employee" or an "employer" is not automatic, 162 the Court stated:
As the EEOC's standard reflects, an employer is the person, or
group of persons, who owns and manages the enterprise. The em-
ployer can hire and fire employees, can assign tasks to employees
and supervise their performance, and can decide how the profits and
losses of the business are to be distributed. The mere fact that a
person has a particular title-such as partner, director, or vice presi-
dent-should not necessarily be used to determine whether he or she
is an employee or a proprietor. Nor should the mere existence of a
document styled 'employment agreement' lead inexorably to the
conclusion that either party is an employee. Rather, as was true in
applying common law rules to the independent-contractor-versus-
employee issue confronted in Darden, the answer to whether a
shareholder-director is an employee depends on "'all of the incidents
of the relationship ... with no one factor being decisive."' 1 63
The Court noted that some of the lower court findings in Clackamas
indicate that the physician-shareholders are not "employees": the doc-
tors "apparently"1 64 control the operation of the clinic, share its profits,
and are personally liable for malpractice claims.165 On the other hand,
the record also contained evidence suggesting an employment relation-
ship between the clinic and the doctors: the physicians receive salaries,
must comply with clinic standards, and report to a personnel manager. 166
Given this contradictory evidence, the Court reversed the Court of Ap-
peals' decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.167 The
Court, however, gave the lower court little guidance about the relative
weight to accord to each of the factors, a failure that could lead to widely
inconsistent judgments. Justice Ginsburg in dissent, joined by Justice
Breyer, criticized the majority for selecting control as the most important
common-law indicia of a master-servant relationship over other indicia.
The dissent argued that the physician-shareholders apparently meet the
Restatement (Second) of Agency definition of "servant.' 6 8 Justice Gins-
burg noted that the Restatement defines a "'servant' as "'an agent em-
ployed by a master to perform service in his affairs whose physical
conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is subject to the
right to control by the master."" 1 69 The physician-shareholders seem to
fit this definition because they provide services on behalf of the profes-
sional corporation, have employment contracts with the corporation, re-
ceive salaries and yearly bonuses, work at facilities owned or leased by
the corporation, and must comply with standards set by the corpora-
162. Id. at 1680 n.10.
163. Id. at 1680-81 (citations omitted) (omission in original).
164. Id. at 1681.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1681 n.11.
167. Id. 1681.
168. Id. at 1681-82 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 1681 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(2) (1958)).
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tion. 170 The dissent noted that the introductory note to the Restatement
states that highly placed personnel of a corporation are no less servants
than those with more modest wages even when they are not controlled in
their day-to-day work. 17'
Other factors led the dissent to conclude that the physician-sharehold-
ers were "employees" for purposes of the ADA. For example, the defen-
dant, Clackamas, conceded that the physician-shareholders were
"employees" for purposes of ERISA, covered by Oregon's worker's com-
pensation statute, and had created an entity permitting themselves to
limit liability for corporate debts.172
Furthermore, the dissent continued, there are no reasons why the ADA
should not apply to this professional corporation. Congress exempted
businesses having fewer than fifteen employees from the ADA to protect
small firms from the expense of complying with the anti-discrimination
laws. The dissent noted, however, that classification of the physician-
shareholders in this case did not change the size of Clackamas Gastroen-
terology: during the relevant time period, the defendant regularly had
four physician-shareholders and at least fourteen other employees. 173
Therefore, the dissent concluded, refusing ADA protection to the plain-
tiff, a clerical worker of defendant company, was unjustified.
Justice Ginsberg's bottom line is that a functional approach should de-
termine whether a person is an employee under the anti-discrimination
acts because this approach furthers the intention and language of the
ADA. The test I propose below responds to Justice Ginsberg's concerns
and gives operation to the majority test.
3. Clackamas: No Resolution of Form Versus Function
In Clackamas, the Court never explicitly addressed the split among
the circuits concerning how to classify bona fide partners under state
partnership law who have insufficient power in the organization to pro-
tect themselves from discrimination. By adopting the EEOC guidelines,
Clackamas expanded the narrow exception recognized by Justice Pow-
ell's concurrence in Hishon. By requiring an inquiry into the ability of
the individual to influence the organization, Standard Four of the EEOC
guidelines apparently condones a close examination of the relationships
within the partnership. But just how far the EEOC standards extend to
permit a functional approach is unclear. Clackamas gives little or no gui-
dance to the lower courts. It merely remanded the case to the lower
court, noting that while it appeared that the physician-shareholders were
not "employees," contradictory evidence existed in the record. This con-
tradictory evidence included: an employment agreement, standards to
which the physician-shareholders must conform, the collection of earn-
170. See id. at 1681-82.
171. Id. at 1682.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1682-83.
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ings as salaries, and the power of the personnel director to control the
doctors. The Court's opinion did not guide the lower court in deciding
how to weigh the pro-employee factors against the counter veiling factors
identified by the Court.
This discretion left to lower courts is both an opportunity to develop
the law and a burden that may lead to simplistic and/or inconsistent re-
sults. Although the Court could have written a thoughtful opinion, simi-
lar to Judge Posner's opinion in Sidley Austin, it instead adopted a
simplistic approach, laying out little more than the list of factors devel-
oped by the EEOC. In Sidley Austin, Judge Posner criticized the EEOC
for automatically applying the standards and failing to understand and
justify their use. Posner asked for a more robust examination of the dis-
tinction between a partner who is not an "employee" and one who is.
The same criticism applies to the majority opinion in Clackamas. It fails
in large part because with little analysis it implicitly adopts the presump-
tion underlying the EEOC guidelines that bona fide partners who have
the ability to exercise at least some control over the organization are or-
dinarily not employees.
Like the Supreme Court, however, Judge Posner makes another unex-
amined assumption: that the anti-discrimination laws do not permit an
individual classification as both "employer" and "employee." When it
comes to this assumption, I part company with Judge Posner's analysis.
There are many bona fide partners under state partnership law who are
"employers," as defined by the anti-discrimination acts, but who also
should be "employees" for purposes of the acts. This duality is consistent
with the anti-discrimination laws as I will demonstrate next in Part IV.A.
IV. CRITIQUE: CLACKAMAS' FAILED PROMISE
A. FAULTY FUNDAMENTALS: DUAL ROLES OF "EMPLOYER"
AND "EMPLOYEE"
The statutory language makes clear that the Court's assumption in
Clackamas that one cannot be an "employer" and an "employee" simul-
taneously is erroneous. 174 Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA define a
partnership, like a corporation, as a "person" who can be sued if it has
sufficient "employees" to meet the definition of "employer. ' 175 The
174. The dissent questions this assumption, but does not develop the argument that a
partner or shareholder in a PC could occupy a dual role as employer and employee. See id
at 1681 ("There is nothing inherently inconsistent between the coexistence of a proprietary
relationship and an employment relationship." (quoting Goldberg v. Whitaker House
Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 32 (1961))).
175. Title VII defines a person as "one or more individuals, governments ... partner-
ships." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1994).
Title VII defines an "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calen-
dar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person."
§ 2000e(b) (emphasis added).
Like Title VII, the ADEA defines partnerships as persons, and defines an "employer" to
include any agent of the person. 29 U.S.C. § 630(a)-(b).
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ADA defines an "employer" to include an agent.' 76 It also defines "per-
son" in the same manner as Title VII.177 Moreover, the anti-discrimina-
tion acts define an "employer" to include agents of a person engaged in
industry affecting commerce with the requisite number of employees. 7 8
If the partnership has sufficient "employees" to be an "employer" under
the acts, the partners act as the agents of the partnership for purposes of
the anti-discrimination acts. For example, if a partner in a law firm fires
an "employee" because of his race, the partnership will be liable to the
"employee" under Title VII for the partner's action. The result is the
same if a vice president or other manager of the corporation fires an "em-
ployee" because of his race. The partner and vice president are treated
the same. They are both agents of the partnership and/or corporation.
This agency relationship brings the partner and vice president within the
definition of "employer" under the anti-discrimination law. 179
No one doubts that the vice president who is an "employer" as defined
by the anti-discrimination acts is also an "employee" of the corporation
covered by the anti-discrimination law. Although the vice president or
other upper level manager of a corporation can be simultaneously an
"employer" and an "employee" under the anti-discrimination acts, the
176. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(5) (2000).
177. See § 12,111(7).
178. See § 2000e(b).
179. All of the circuits that have addressed the issue of individual liability under the
anti-discrimination statutes have held that supervisors are not subject to individual liability
for violations. See, e.g., Lissau v. S. Food Serv., 159 F.3d 177, 180-81 (4th Cir. 1998); Sheri-
dan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1077-78 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc)
(holding that individual employees may not be held liable under Title VII); Haynes v.
Williams, 88 F.3d 898, 899 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that relief granted under Title VII is
against the employer and not the individual employee whose actions would constitute vio-
lation of the Act); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that
individual defendants with supervisory control may not be held personally liable under
Title VII); Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech., Inc., 55 F.3d 377, 380-81 (8th Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that supervisors and other employees cannot be held liable under Title VII in their
individual capacities); Cross v. Ala. State Dep't Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 49
F.3d 1490, 1504 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that individual liability suits under Title VII are
inappropriate because the relief granted is against the employer and not individual em-
ployees); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that the purpose of
the agent provision is to incorporate respondeat superior liability into Title VII and that a
supervisory employee can be sued only as an agent of an employer and not in a personal
capacity); Miller v. Maxwell Inst. Ins., 991 F.2d 583, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that
civil liability under Title VII and the ADEA is limited to employers and that individuals
cannot be held liable for damages). The First Circuit has not addressed the issue. Lopez v.
Police Dep't, 247 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 2001).
However, if an individual meets the definition of "employer" in the anti-discrimination
statutes there seems to be a potential for personal liability. Some courts have left the issue
open. See, e.g., Wathen v. Gen. Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that an
individual employee/supervisor who does not otherwise qualify as an "employer" may not
be held personally liable under Title VII); EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd. 55 F.3d
1276, 1282 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that individuals who do not meet the statutory defini-
tion of "employer" cannot be liable under the ADA); Wilson v. Nutt, No. 94-5750, 1995
U.S. App. LEXIS 35117 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 1995) (holding that an individual defendant
could be sued under Title VII in his official capacity as sheriff); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21
F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that Title VII does not permit liability of individuals
unless they meet the statutory definition of "employer").
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Court assumes that a partner or shareholder cannot serve both roles of
"employer" and "employee." The language of Title VII, the ADEA, and
the ADA do not distinguish between partnerships and general corpora-
tions in their definitions of who is a "person" under the acts; neither does
the statutory language distinguish between partnerships and corporations
as "employers." It cannot be correct, therefore, that partners are not
"employees" merely because they are "employers." The question be-
comes whether the law can justify differential treatment of vice presidents
of corporations on one hand and partners on the other.
Once it is established that, consistent with the language and structure
of the anti-discrimination acts, an individual may occupy the dual roles of
"employer" and "employee," one possible justification for deciding that
partners are not employees is that they are independent contractors who
contract with the partnership. The Acts define "employee" as "an indi-
vidual employed by an employer."180 The courts have interpreted this
language to distinguish between independent contractors and "employ-
ees." A covered employer'81 ordinarily will not be liable for discrimina-
tion against an independent contractor,18 2 but will be liable for
discriminating against its employees.18 3
The relationship between partners and the partnership is normally
closer to an employment relationship than an independent contractor re-
lationship. An independent contractor operates separately from a cov-
ered employer, often with employees of its own. The independent
contractor does not ordinarily share space with the hiring party and will
be paid by the job, rather than a salary or a draw of the profits of the
covered employer's business. Often the independent contractor's work
will not be the main focus of the covered employer's regular business.
Finally, the independent contractor will often have special expertise in an
area in which the employer is not an expert. It is because of this special
expertise that the covered employer will refrain from controlling the
work methods of the independent contractor, while still specifying the
end results desired.
Partners in general partnerships have a much different relationship.
Often, they agree to work together at the same locale using common em-
ployees, space, and materials. The partnership leases or owns the prop-
erty where the work takes place and the partners work for the common
goal of enhancing the business of the partnership. The partnership has
more control over its partners than a covered employer has over its inde-
pendent contractor, often determining either by vote of the entire part-
180. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1994).
181. By "covered employer" I mean one having the statutory minimum number of em-
ployees as required by the different statutes. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); 29 U.S.C. § 630(b);
42 U.S.C. § 12,111(5)(A).
182. An independent contractor who suffers race discrimination, however, may have a
cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
183. The Court has interpreted "employee" to include former employees suing for re-
taliation. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
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nership or by management committee the type of business it will pursue
and the standards by which it will practice its business or profession.
While the partners are sometimes professionals who practice medicine
or law independently, even professionals are ordinarily subject to stan-
dards and/or rules established by the partnership. Partners, unlike inde-
pendent contractors, are bound to the partnership through a common
interest, business, or profession. This commonality of partners, in con-
trast with the lack of connection of independent contractors to the cov-
ered employer, differentiates the two. Partners jointly own the assets of
the business and are jointly and severally liable for its debts. Moreover,
the law imposes fiduciary duties including duties of loyalty, care, and bar-
gaining in good faith on one partner to another and to the partnership. 184
In sum, working partners are rarely independent contractors of the
partnership. If the anti-discrimination laws permit partners to be "em-
ployers" and "employees" simultaneously and partners work for the part-
nership in order to ensure its financial success in a connected fashion the
partners should be "employees" of the partnership for purposes of the
anti-discrimination laws.
There are three responses to this argument. First, partners are owners
of the business and therefore are not "employees." Second, partners
have intimate relationships deserving of constitutional and statutory pro-
tection. Third, partners have the right under partnership law to establish
their relationship by contract and should therefore be permitted to waive
the protection of the law through the partnership agreement. As dis-
cussed next in Part IV.B., none of these arguments is persuasive.
B. DEBATABLE THEORIES FOR EXCLUDING PARTNERS
FROM COVERAGE
1. Partners as Owners?
Equity partners are owners of the partnership; courts including the Su-
preme Court in Clackamas have concluded that this ownership interest
prevents partners from classification as "employees." 18 5 If ownership
were the determining factor, however, employees with stock options and
those who own closely held corporations would also defy classification as
"employees." The courts have never held that these workers' ownership
interest precludes them from classification as "employees." The conclu-
sion that partners are "owners" is insufficient to preclude their classifica-
tion as "employees." Ownership, however, could be a substitute for the
concepts of power and control. If a partner owns the vast majority of the
shares in a partnership, the partner may have the political power derived
from the ownership interest that would prevent the partner from discrim-
ination by the partnership. While the power factor must be considered in
184. UNIF. P'SHIP Act § 103 (1997).
185. See, e.g., Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 123 S. Ct. 1673
(2003); Devine v. Stone, Leyton & Gershman, P.C., 100 F.3d 78 (8th Cir. 1996); Fountain v.
Metcalf, Zima, & Co., P.A., 925 F.2d 1398 (11th Cir. 1991).
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determining the classification of the partner, ownership alone, without
regard to quantity of ownership and the power deriving from the owner-
ship interest is inadequate to preclude coverage of a partner as an em-
ployee by the anti-discrimination acts.
Professor Robert W. Hillman, an expert in partnership law who often
writes about law firm partnerships, notes that there has occurred a de-
cline in the loyalty of partnerships to lawyers who are partners.18 6 While
it has long been standard practice to include expulsion clauses in law firm
partnership agreements, he notes that expulsion is becoming more com-
mon.18 7 Acknowledging that there is a tension between removing a part-
ner and his or her status as a co-owner, Hillman notes that the
contradiction "can be resolved only by recognizing that the normal attrib-
utes of 'ownership' do not extend to partnerships, especially when the
partnerships are professional service firms of significant size. Indeed, the
status of the partner in the modern law firm may more closely approxi-
mate that of an employee than a 'co-owner' of the firm."188
Thus, an ownership interest alone is insufficient to distinguish a partner
from an employee. It is necessary to look at the power the individual
partner wields within the partnership in order to determine whether that
person is an employee of the firm.
2. Constitutional Basis for Exclusion: Association and Speech?
In his concurrence in Hishon, Justice Powell gave two primary reasons
for the conclusion that Title VII should not apply to partners. First, he
suggested that Title VII may impede the "exercise of personal judgment
in choosing one's associates or colleagues. Impediments to the exercise
of one's right to choose one's associates can violate the right of associa-
tion protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. ' 189 Second,
Justice Powell argued that partners could not sue under Title VII because
partners make sensitive decisions about many subjects, ranging from the
compensation accorded to each partner to the type of work to take.190
These decisions are shared, noted Justice Powell, by agreement or
consent. 191
While the Court's opinion in Hishon rejected the constitutional argu-
ment made by King & Spalding, Justice Powell's concurrence attempted
to revive the constitutional claim. None of the other Supreme Court jus-
tices joined his opinion. Moreover, the argument concerning the right to
intimate association is not cognizable under current Supreme Court pre-
186. Robert W. Hillman, Professional Partnerships, Competition, and the Evolution of
Firm Culture: The Case of Law Firms, 26 J. CORP. LAw 1061, 1074 (2001).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1074-75.
189. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 80 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
190. Id. at 80 n.3.
191. Id. at 79-80.
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cedent in the area of public accommodations law, 192 even where the
speech rights would arguably be greater than those of partners in a com-
mercial enterprise.
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, for example, the United States Su-
preme Court held that by requiring the Jaycees to admit women to its
regular membership, the Minnesota Human Rights Act did not violate
the Jaycees' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to freedom of inti-
mate association and expression. 193 The Court explained that the free-
dom of association has two prongs. The first involves the freedom of
intimate association, a "fundamental element of personal liberty. '' 194
This right protects certain personal bonds that play an important role in
American culture and traditions because individuals draw emotional sup-
port and their identities from these close ties. 195 Among the relationships
protected by this concept of individual liberty are those concerning mar-
riage, family, raising and educating children, and co-habitation with one's
relatives.1 96 Relationships that are clearly not protected by this concept
are those involving a large business enterprise. 197 For relationships fall-
ing in between these extremes, the Court endorsed considering a number
of variables including: size, selectivity, seclusion from others in certain
aspects of the relationship, purpose, policies, and congeniality. 198 The
Court held that because the Jaycees had a large, unselective group of
members and much of the Jaycee activity centers around the participation
of strangers in the formation and maintenance of relationships, the mem-
bers lacked the type of relationship that would be a protected intimate
association. 199
The second prong of freedom of association is the right to associate for
the purpose of engaging in speech protected by the First Amendment.200
While the Jaycees had a right to associative expression including the right
not to associate with persons who have different views, this right is not
absolute. 20 Examining the Minnesota Human Rights Act, the Court
192. When Congress debated the specifics of Title VII the bill's opponents made claims
very similar to those expressed by Justice Powell. The Southern Democrats who disagreed
with Title VII argued that the bill violated their liberty rights to hire and work with whom-
ever they desired. Congress passed the Act despite these arguments. See LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS Acr or 1964, at 2064-65 (Minority
Report upon Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1963, Committee on Judiciary Substitute for
H.R. 7152) (United States Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n ed., 1968) [hereinaf-
ter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. For more discussion of the opposition's arguments against
Title VII, see Ann C. McGinley, The Emerging Cronyism Defense and Affirmative Action:
A Critical Perspective on the Distinction Between Colorblind and Race-Conscious Decision
Making Under Title VII, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1003, 1011-16 (1997).
193. 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (discussing MINN. STAT. § 363.03(3) (1982)).
194. Id. at 617-18.
195. Id. at 618-19.
196. Id. at 619-20.
197. Id. at 620.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 621.
200. Id. at 618.
201. See id. at 623.
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concluded that the State had a compelling interest in removing the barri-
ers to economic advancement and the political and social integration of
women and minorities into society.20 2 Moreover, Minnesota had ad-
vanced its interests by using the least restrictive means available.20 3 The
Jaycees were unable to show that the admission of women members
would cause any serious burdens on the male members' freedom of ex-
pressive association. The Court emphasized that the Minnesota Human
Rights Law did not attempt to suppress speech or to distinguish between
prohibited and permitted activity on the basis of viewpoint, nor did it
authorize the law's enforcement on such an impermissible basis. 20 4
Justice O'Connor concurred, concluding that state regulation of com-
mercial associative speech should be subject to the deferential rational
relationship test, instead of the compelling state interest test. Citing
Hishon, the concurrence noted that ordinary commercial law practice is
not protected expression, while lawyering to advance social goals may
fairly be characterized as speech. 20 5
Soon after Roberts, the Court applied similar reasoning to the admis-
sion of women to the Rotary Club in Board of Directors of Rotary Inter-
national v. Rotary Club of Duarte and upheld the Unruh California Civil
Rights Act, which prohibited discrimination based on sex.20 6 Like the
Jaycees, the Rotary was unable to demonstrate that the admission of wo-
men would harm its ability to carry out its basic goals. Even if it were to
show a slight infringement, the state's compelling interest in eliminating
discrimination against women outweighed the speech interest of the
defendant. 207
The Court revisited the issue in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,208
holding that the application of New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination
(LAD) 20 9 against the Boy Scouts (BSA) for firing a troop leader because
he was gay would infringe the associative speech rights of the organiza-
tion because it had a clear purpose to "instill values in young people. '21 0
Because the BSA had interpreted "values" to include an opposition to
homosexuality 21 ' and the inclusion of Dale would cause some to believe
that it condoned homosexuality, the New Jersey LAD prohibition of
Dale's firing infringed on the BSA's associational expressive rights. 21 2
202. Id. at 623-28.
203. See id. at 629.
204. Id. at 623.
205. Id. at 636.
206. 481 U.S. 537 (1987) (upholding CAL. Civ. CODE § 51 (1982)).
207. See id. at 549.
208. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
209. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4 to :5-5 (2003).
210. Dale, 530 U.S. at 649.
211. A blistering dissent by Justice Stevens contradicted the majority's characterization
of the BSA's opposition advocacy to homosexuality. Id. at 667-78 (stating that the Boy
Scouts' "only policy written before the revocation of Dale's membership was an equivocal,
undisclosed statement that evidences no connection between the group's discriminatory
intentions and its expressive interests").
212. See id. at 650.
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Dale's precedential value may be somewhat diminished after the Su-
preme Court's recent opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, which declared un-
constitutional the Texas anti-sodomy law. 213 Even if Dale is good law, the
circumstances there are significantly different from those in a partnership
that attempts to discriminate against one of its partners. Unlike the Boy
Scouts, a partnership is ordinarily in business for the purpose of further-
ing its own economic interests; therefore, it would be very unlikely that
the First and Fifth Amendments would protect the partnership's freedom
of association and associative speech. Moreover, like the Minnesota and
California anti-discrimination laws, Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA
make no attempt to regulate speech or to discriminate on the basis of
viewpoint. In Hishon, the unanimous Court rejected the defendant's
First Amendment argument because the petitioner had not shown how its
ability to contribute to society's beliefs would be inhibited by a merit-
based consideration of Hishon for partner.214 Moreover, the majority in
Roberts cited to Hishon for the same proposition, comparing the Jaycees'
failure of proof to that in Hishon.215 Finally, in her concurrence in Rob-
erts, Justice O'Connor stated that law firms do not generally engage in
protected speech.216
An extraordinary, narrow exception to this general rule might conceiv-
ably exist. For example, a small family law firm might argue successfully
that application of Title VII to define its partners as "employees" would
violate the intimate right of association. A law partnership created to
further the public interest by lobbying or bringing high stakes litigation
might successfully defend a Title VII suit claiming that the law's applica-
tion to its partners violates the right of associative speech. This, however,
is a very limited exception, if it exists at all, to the general rule that the
First and Fifth Amendments should not immunize a law partnership's se-
lection and treatment of its partners from the reach of Title VII, the
ADEA, and the ADA.
3. Pragmatic Basis for Exclusion: Trust?
Besides the constitutional dimension of Justice Powell's objection to
treating partners as "employees," there is a pragmatic one. An organiza-
tion making sensitive decisions about its members is vulnerable if a law-
suit reveals its decision making processes. A partnership makes subjec-
tive evaluations without having the courts second-guess them. A lack of
trust from within could destroy a firm if a member of the firm could chal-
lenge its judgments in court. Moreover, the argument goes, courts are
not capable of understanding the firm's decision making.
213. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). But see id. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that dis-
crimination against homosexuals is a constitutional right in some circumstances).
214. 467 U.S. at 78. While Justice Powell raised the possibility of protection of a part-
nership from Title VII under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, no other Justices
joined in his concurrence.
215. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626.
216. Id. at 636.
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The concept of a partnership as an intimate, selective, trusting relation-
ship, similar to that of a marriage, appears throughout the cases and other
literature on partnerships.2 17 A striking example is Bohatch v. Butler &
Binion218 in which the Texas Supreme Court held that a law firm was not
liable for a breach of fiduciary duty for firing a partner who suspected
and reported another partner's ethical violations.21 9 Rejecting the argu-
ment of a number of distinguished legal scholars who filed an amicus
brief urging the court to recognize that public policy should forbid the
expulsion of a partner who in good faith reports a suspected ethical viola-
tion, the court emphasized the "private," "intimate" and "selective" na-
ture of the partnership, noting:
A partnership exists solely because the partners choose to place per-
sonal confidence and trust in one another .... Such charges, whether
true or not, may have a profound effect on the personal confidence
and trust essential to the partner relationship. Once such charges are
made, partners may find it impossible to continue to work together
to their mutual benefit and the benefit of their clients.
... [T]he dissenting Justices do not explain how the trust relationship
necessary both for the firm's existence and for representing clients
can survive such serious accusations by one partner against another.
The threat of tort liability for expulsion would tend to force partners
to remain in untenable circumstance-suspicious of and angry
with each other-to their own detriment and that of their clients
whose matters are neglected by lawyers distracted with intra-firm
frictions. 220
In Bohatch, the Texas Supreme Court voiced arguments that were re-
jected by the United States Supreme Court years earlier in Hishon.
These points are startlingly similar to those made by the opponents of
Title VII in 1963 before its passage. Opponents made the libertarian ar-
gument that Title VII would deprive employers of the constitutional right
of association rooted in the First Amendment to hire, work with, and
discharge whomever they pleased.221 Of course, Title VII passed into law
in spite of this opposition; furthermore, opponents of Title VII have not
convinced the courts that it is unconstitutional. Partnerships in large part
are indistinguishable from other business forms: they are generally
formed to make a profit. The relationship between partners, therefore,
should not be protected as a sacrosanct exception to the application of
the anti-discrimination laws.
Moreover, these arguments are similar to those already rejected by the
Supreme Court in University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC.222 In University
217. See, e.g., Paula J. Dalley, The Law of Partner Expulsions, Fiduciary Duty and
Good Faith, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 181, 181 (1999).
218. 977 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1998).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 546-47.
221. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 192, at 2064-65.
222. 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
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of Pennsylvania, an Asian-American filed a charge with the EEOC alleg-
ing that the university had denied her tenure on the basis of sex, national
origin, and race.223 The EEOC subpoenaed the files of the complaining
party and of five male professors who were granted tenure at the time she
was denied.224 The university challenged the subpoena, arguing for a
qualified privilege in peer review materials.22 5 After the Third Circuit
refused to recognize a qualified privilege, 226 the Supreme Court affirmed,
unanimously holding that no qualified privilege should exist. 227 The uni-
versity based its argument on the concept of academic freedom protected
by the first amendment. 228 It claimed that without a privilege, the univer-
sity's ability to shape its own identity was in danger.2 29 A proper peer
review system is necessary, the university claimed, to the future of the
tenure system. Without confidentiality, authors of the peer review mater-
ials would be reluctant to write honest evaluations about candidates for
tenure.230 Moreover, the university claimed that compelling disclosure of
peer review materials would create divisiveness and tension in the faculty,
thus placing a strain on faculty relations and impairing the free exchange
of ideas.2 31 Because of these detrimental effects on academic freedom,
the university argued, the first amendment compels recognition of a
privilege.
An unanimous Supreme Court rejected these arguments, noting that
the requirement that peer review materials be produced is neither con-
tent-based nor a direct infringement on speech.232 Moreover, the Court
noted, if a privilege existed, universities could use the privilege in a way
that "frustrates the EEOC's mission. ' 233 The Court noted that "courts
have stressed the importance of avoiding second-guessing of legitimate
academic judgments. 2 34 While courts should continue to avoid overrul-
ing legitimate judgments made in academia, the Supreme Court opined,
however, that a failure to permit the EEOC the power to investigate peer
review documents may give a potent weapon to employers who are intent
on violating Title VII.235 The Court noted its concern that a ruling favor-
ing the university could be used by law firms to shelter their decision
making processes:
Acceptance of petitioner's claim would also lead to a wave of similar
privilege claims by other employers who play significant roles in fur-
thering speech and learning in society. What of writers, publishers,
223. Id. at 185.
224. Id. at 186.
225. Id.
226. See EEOC v. Univ. of Pa., 850 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1988).
227. Univ. of Pa., 493 U.S. at 199-200.
228. Id. at 188, 196.
229. Id. at 196.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 196-97.
232. Id. at 197-98.
233. Id. at 194.
234. Id. at 199.
235. Id. at 194 (citing EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 81 (1984)).
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musicians, lawyers? It surely is not unreasonable to believe, for exam-
ple, that confidential peer reviews play an important part in partner-
ship determinations at some law firms.236
The relationship among partners is very similar to that among tenured
professors. In fact, the average tenured law professor has more power
than a typical partner in a large law firm. In both situations, the group
makes sensitive decisions concerning the careers of persons applying for
membership in the group and concerning the management of the organi-
zational unit. Although disclosure of private information can cause ten-
sion among the ranks, the Court held in University of Pennsylvania that
this objection is insufficient to prevent the EEOC from discovering docu-
ments relevant to proving that the institution discriminates illegally.
While an argument exists that University of Pennsylvania is distinguisha-
ble because Congress specifically amended Title VII in 1972 to cover uni-
versities, no such amendment was necessary for partnerships. The
original Act specifically included partnerships as covered persons. More-
over, it has never exempted partners from the classification of
''employee."
Finally, if, as the Court's opinion in Clackamas suggests, the Court
wishes to have consistency between similar business forms and relation-
ships, a functional approach would compel that partners and tenured uni-
versity professors be treated identically under the anti-discrimination
laws. Identical treatment would require the recognition that many, if not
most, partners be treated as employees under the anti-discrimination acts.
4. Contractarianism and "Paternalism": Waiver of "Employee" Rights?
The American Law Institute ("ALI") membership approved the Re-
vised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA") in 1995.237 "RUPA reflects
the policy judgment that, with rare exceptions, partners are permitted to
govern relations among themselves by agreement. '2 38 Many of the new
partnership "rules" under RUPA are default rules, not mandatory
rules. 239 Partners, therefore, can choose to form contracts that would
change the default rules. RUPA's endorsement of the freedom to con-
tract furthers the notion that partners are equals who can bargain away
protections provided by law. RUPA, however, also clarifies responsibili-
ties among the partners and to the partnership-duties of loyalty, care,
236. Id. (emphasis added).
237. As of 2002, thirty-one states have adopted RUPA with its 1997 Amendments,
which provide limited liability for partners in a limited liability partnership. Three states
have adopted RUPA with the 1994 Amendments, which explicitly address the fiduciary
responsibilities of partners to each other, providing for express obligations of loyalty, due
care, and due faith. The UPA had been adopted by all states, except Louisiana. National
Conference Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, A Few Facts about the Uniform Part-
nership Act (2000), at http://www. nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-
upa9497.asp.
238. See Donald J. Weidner & John W. Larson, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act:




and good faith bargaining.2 40 While these duties can be altered to some
extent by agreement among the partners, they cannot be totally elimi-
nated.241 The reporter, Dean Donald Weidner explains:
Four fiduciary and information rules cannot be negated by the part-
nership agreement. First, the agreement may not "unreasonably re-
strict the right of access to books and records." Second, the
agreement may not "eliminate the duty of loyalty," "but the partners
by agreement may identify specific types or categories of activities
that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasona-
ble. Third, the agreement may not "unreasonably reduce the duty of
care." Fourth, the agreement may not "eliminate the obligation of
good faith and fair dealing," "but the partners by agreement may
determine the standards by which the performance obligation is to
be measured, if the standards are not manifestly unreasonable. '242
According to Dean Weidner, RUPA reaches a compromise between
the "libertarians" who would like to see the parties held to their contracts
and the "parentalists '2 43 who support mandatory fiduciary duties, "espe-
cially to protect minority244 partners. ' '245
RUPA's changes were controversial among scholars specializing in
partnership law.246 The debate concerning RUPA's proposed changes in
the fiduciary duties owed by partners reflected a discussion that was si-
multaneously occurring in corporate law concerning the proper role of
government regulation in the corporation. 247 The contractarians, basing
their theory on the law and economics movement, argued that a corpora-
tion is a set of private contractual relationships among providers of capi-
tal and services.2 48 This view permitted corporate managers to contract
out of their fiduciary duties to shareholders. 249 The anti-contractarians
saw a greater role for government regulation in the corporation, arguing
that the fiduciary duties of a corporate manager should be imposed by
240. See id. at 21-23.
241. See id. at 26-27.
242. Id. at 26-27.
243. Dean Weidner uses the term "parentalists" rather than "paternalists," id. at 27, I
assume, to avoid taking a gender-based approach.
244. The term "minority" is used here to denote a person with a minority interest in the
partnership, not race.
245. Weidner & Larson, supra note 238 at 27-28; see also J. Dennis Hynes, Fiduciary
Duties and RUPA: An Inquiry into Freedom of Contract, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring
1995, at 29 (arguing that the fiduciary duties should be handled by contract); Allan W.
Vestal, Advancing the Search for Compromise: A Response to Professor Hynes, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1995, at 55 (arguing that RUPA reduces the protections of fidu-
ciary duties too drastically).
246. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Naked Emperor: A Corporate Lawyer Looks at
RUPA 's Fiduciary Provisions, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 465,470-471 (1997) (describing the
debate as "the kind of emotional responses normally reserved for religious or political
debate").
247. See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Re-
sponse to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990).
248. Id.
249. See id. at 4.
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law and non-waivable. 250 Like the split among corporate law experts, the
division over the revisions in the partnership law also featured con-
tractarian and anti-contractarian views. The contractarians argued for a
change in the fiduciary relationship among the partners, lessening the
role of self-denial for the purposes of the partnership.2 51 The anti-con-
tractarians, however, sought to preserve more legal protections for
greater fiduciary responsibilities.2 52
While the Reporter, Dean Weidner, views the result as achieving a bal-
ance between the interests of "libertarians" and those of the "parental-
ists," a debate that I choose not to engage here, there is no question that
RUPA increased the ability of partners to contract out of certain fiduciary
responsibilities. Moreover, those protections that remain deal merely
with the economic relationship among the parties. RUPA does not ac-
count, for example, for the eventuality that an "equal" partner may suffer
from discrimination in the partnership that can manifest itself in eco-
nomic or dignitary harm because of the partner's sex, age, race, or
disability.
In fact, partnership law appears unequal to the task. According to Pro-
fessor Hillman, partnership law is inadequate to protect "unequal" part-
ners in modern law firms:
Sadly, partnership law today remains largely premised on a unitary,
classic model of the partnership-that is to say, partnerships are col-
legial and egalitarian associations of partners as co-equals, with each
partner actively participating in the management of the firm and
sharing in its profits and losses. This premise cannot be further from
the reality of modern law partnerships. Non-equity partners, non-
voting partners, contract attorneys, part-time partners, of-counsel,
branch offices as quasi-independent units within partnerships, mass
layoffs of partners, and limited income sharing (not so elegantly de-
scribed on the street as "you eat what you kill") are among the con-
cepts and activities increasingly prevalent but difficult to reconcile
with the classic model of the partnership premised on the equality of
partners. The simplicity of the structure suggested by law is defied
by the complexity and diversity of modern law partnerships, which
may suggest partnership law is losing its relevance to lawyers associ-
ated under the label "partnership. '25 3
250. See id.; see also Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., Corporate Fiduciary Principles for the
Post-Contractarian Era, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 561, 579 (1996) (arguing that fiduciary
duties of corporate managers should be shaped by three principles: the manager's max-
imization of the corporation's wealth, the manager's avoidance of wealth transfers without
consent, and the prohibition against the managers' allocation of gain to themselves). For a
discussion of fiduciary duties and contract law, see Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Meta-
phor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 885 (1988), which notes
that contract principles may be illuminating but make a limited contribution toward resolv-
ing issues of fiduciary duty.
251. See e.g., Hynes, supra note 245.
252. See Allan W. Vestal, Fundamental Contractarian Error in the Revised Uniform
Partnership Act of 1992, 73 B.U. L. REV. 523 (1993).
253. See Robert W. Hillman, The Impact of Partnership Law on the Legal Profession, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 413 (1998) [hereinafter Hillman, Legal Profession]; see also Robert
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Because RUPA does not protect the more vulnerable partners against
discrimination, the anti-discrimination acts should apply, as a general
rule, to most partners in partnerships. Because the anti-discrimination
laws define "employers" as businesses having at least fifteen "employ-
ees," partnerships with fewer than fifteen employees, including partners
who are employees, would not be covered by Title VII and the ADA.
Partnerships with fewer than twenty employees, including partners who
are employees, would not be covered by the ADEA.
If partners are "employees" under the anti-discrimination acts, they
should not be permitted to waive coverage by contract. The courts have
held that before a dispute arises an individual can waive his or her right
to a judicial forum in favor of arbitration of a federal statutory right. This
rule, however, does not apply to prospective waivers of substantive rights
granted by the federal employment discrimination acts. 254 The purpose
W. Hillman, Law Firms and Their Partners: The Law and Ethics of Grabbing and Leaving,
67 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1988) [hereinafter Hillman, Grabbing and Leaving] (discussing the
conflicting obligations lawyers in law partnerships have under the professional rules,
agency, partnership, and tort laws); Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift:
Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the
Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229 (1995) (arguing that the professionalism paradigm of the law
firm should give way to a business paradigm that permits a better approach to serve cli-
ents). An argument can be made that, at least before RUPA, a partner violates a fiduciary
duty to another partner and to the partnership itself by engaging in discrimination against
the second partner. My research, however, has not unveiled any cases upholding a discrim-
ination claim using fiduciary duty law. Another possible argument could conceivably be
that discrimination by a partner or the partnership against a partner violates the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing that is implied in all contracts. Cf. Paula J. Dalley, The Law
of Partner Expulsions: Fiduciary Duty and Good Faith, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 181 (1999)
(arguing that an expulsion is not a breach of fiduciary duty; however it may violate the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing). While these approaches may be possible,
they would depend on the vagaries of state law and would not provide the same remedies
or protections as the federal anti-discrimination laws. For example, California provides
merely contract remedies in employment cases where the plaintiff proves a breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47
Cal. 3d 654, 663 (1988). Likewise, in a suit alleging that race discrimination in employment
violates the state's public policy and would, therefore, create a wrongful discharge cause of
action in a small employer, the Nevada Supreme Court held that there was no wrongful
discharge. See Chavez v. Sievers, 43 P.3d 1022 (Nev. 2002) (concluding that it was up to
the Nevada legislature to define "employer" and that the legislature had determined that
small employers were not covered by the Civil Rights Act, NEV. REV. STAT. 613.330(1)
(2003)).
254. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974). The Court stated that:
To begin, we think it clear that there can be no prospective waiver of an
employee's rights under Title VII. It is true, of course, that a union may
waive certain statutory rights related to collective activity, such as the right to
strike. These rights are conferred on employees collectively to foster the
processes of bargaining and properly may be exercised or relinquished by the
union as collective-bargaining agent to obtain economic benefits for union
members. Title VII, on the other hand, stands on plainly different ground; it
concerns not majoritarian processes, but an individual's right to equal em-
ployment opportunities. Title VII's strictures are absolute and represent a
congressional command that each employee be free from discriminatory
practices. Of necessity, the rights conferred can form no part of the collec-
tive-bargaining process since waiver of these rights would defeat the para-
mount congressional purpose behind Title VII. In these circumstances, an
employee's rights under Title VII are not susceptible of prospective waiver.
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behind this general rule is sound. The federal employment discrimination
statutes are reflections of public policy that an individual should not be
permitted to waive substantive civil rights in order to gain advantage over
others who leave open the option to seek the laws' protection. Such a
waiver could potentially create the atmosphere of a "race to the bottom,"
with employers typically requiring employees to forego their federal stat-
utory rights in order to gain employment. This behavior would lead to the
weakening of the statutory protections for all members of the protected
classes. Lawyers would advise their business clients to attempt to "con-
tract out" of their equal employment opportunity responsibilities because
the law would permit such advice. 255 If such contracts were made, busi-
nesses and partnerships would be less concerned with avoiding discrimi-
natory behavior against members of protected classes.
Thus, a person entering into a partnership agreement could not prop-
erly waive his or her substantive statutory rights by agreeing that he or
she will not be treated as an employee if his or her function within the
organization is that of an employee, as defined by the statutes.
Even if a potential partner has superior economic bargaining power at
the time of the formation of the partnership agreement, the law should
refuse to allow him or her to waive federal statutory rights before the
dispute arises. The federal anti-discrimination laws protect dignity inter-
ests as well as economic interests and a determination of whether a part-
ner fits the definition of employee should be made after the dispute arises
based on the function of the person within the organization, his or her
relationship with the other partners, and his or her connection to the
organization.
5. Partnerships as "Aggregates" or "Entities"?
The original concept of a partnership, the aggregate theory, concluded
that a partnership was an aggregate of individuals.256 Under this theory,
when one partner resigned, the partnership dissolved and a new partner-
ship formed.25 7 Because this theory created problems in stability and
continuity, the Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA") explicitly
Id. at 50-51 (citations omitted). Referring to other cases in which the Court had enforced
arbitration of statutory rights, the Court stated, "[i]n these cases we recognized that 'by
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights af-
forded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judi-
cial, forum."' Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (discussing
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)); see
also Adams v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 67 F.3d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1985) ("It is the general rule in
this circuit that an employee may not prospectively waive his or her rights under either
Title VII or the ADEA.").
255. Cf Therese H. Maynard, Law Matters, Lawyers Matter, 76 TULANE L. REV. 1501,
1526-27 (2002) (arguing that for lawyers to advise their business clients in a way that would
lead to fair outcomes for all, lawyers need to be assured that the fiduciary duty of loyalty is
mandatory, not waivable).




endorsed the entity theory of partnership, 258 which treats the partnership
as an entity rather than an aggregate of individuals.259 Under the entity
theory, when one partner leaves the partnership, the partnership can con-
tinue to exist without creating a new partnership.260
By defining a "partnership" as a "person" capable of being sued, Title
VII, the ADEA, and the ADA, even before the approval of RUPA, ap-
plied the entity theory to partnerships. RUPA's endorsement of the en-
tity theory supports the view that a partnership is a separate entity
subject to a lawsuit under the anti-discrimination statutes. Thus, the ag-
gregate theory does not bar the conclusion that a partner is an "em-
ployee" who can sue the partnership, a separate entity.261
Joint and several liability may be the only obstacle to suit by a partner
against the partnership for discrimination, and the only indicator that the
partner is not an "employee." A conclusion that a partner's liability for
obligations and debts alone is sufficient to prevent classification as an
"employee" under the anti-discrimination laws, however, would contra-
vene the policies of the acts. In Sidley Austin, Judge Posner expressed
doubts about whether this responsibility is sufficient to immunize the
partnership from a lawsuit by older equity partners who were de-
moted.262 Partners who lack political, economic and/or social power but
who are responsible for debts are likely very vulnerable to discrimination
and its effects.
The anti-discrimination laws' policies include protecting the economic
well-being and the dignity of workers regardless of their race, color, na-
tional origin, religion, sex, age, or disability, compensating workers for
their losses and deterring future losses. These policies, Congress be-
lieved, would further the ability of persons who are vulnerable to discrim-
ination in employment to gain and retain employment consistent with
their abilities.263 Part IV.C expounds on the Court's failure to discuss the
important aspect of vulnerability in determining whether a partner is an
"employee," and the increasing role dignitary harms play in discrimina-
tion law.
C. PROTECTING AGAINST VULNERABILITY TO DISCRIMINATION
Clackamas never considered the individual's vulnerability to discrimi-
nation and its economic and social effects as factors to weigh in deciding
258. Id. at 5-6.
259. UNIF. P'SHip Acr § 201 (1997).
260. See Weidner & Larson, supra note 238, at 8.
261. At least one scholar has criticized RUPA's claim of endorsement of the entity the-
ory as "bald hyperbole," however. See Robert W. Hillman, RUPA and Former Partners:
Cutting the Gordian Knot with Continuing Partnership Entities, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
Spring 1995, at 7, 28. Professor Hillman concluded that "true implementation of the entity
model would eliminate joint and several liability of partners, which is a strong vestige of
the aggregate view of partnerships." Id.
262. EEOC v. Sidley Austin, 315 F.3d 696, 704 (7th Cir. 2002).
263. For a discussion of the legislative history of Title VII demonstrating a merit-based
approach to the statute, see McGinley, supra note 192, at 1011-16.
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whether an individual is an "employee." My thesis posits that if an indi-
vidual's lack of power in the organization creates a potential for vulnera-
bility to discrimination and its effects, this factor should weigh heavily in
favor of treating him or her as an "employee."
In Clackamas, upon remand, the lower court should go beyond political
power, considering in addition whether the dynamics, organization, and
power, both economic and social, may subject one or more of the physi-
cian-shareholders to vulnerability to discrimination and its effects. More-
over, a broad interpretation of Standard Four of the EEOC, "[t]he ability
to influence the organization," encompasses not only the power granted
in the documents or oral history establishing the relationship, but also the
actual relationship among the partners or shareholders. If, for example,
the dynamics or structure of the organization would permit three of the
four shareholder-physicians in Clackamas to decide to oust or reduce the
salary or bonus of the fourth because she is pregnant or has a disability,
that relationship between the PC and the individual-shareholder most
likely would be one of an employer-employee. The court should reach
the same conclusion if the power dynamics permit sexual or racial harass-
ment of one of the partners.
Clackamas also fails to consider that Title VII, the ADEA, and the
ADA protect not only economic interests, but also the dignity interests of
the individuals. Congress made the dignitary rights explicit when it
passed the 1991 Civil Rights Act, which amended Title VII and the ADA.
In these amendments, Congress added the right to jury trials of legal
claims and compensatory and punitive damages where intentional dis-
crimination occurs.264 The legislative history of the 1991 Act demon-
strates that a driving force for adding jury trials and compensatory and
punitive damages was the increasing recognition of hostile work environ-
ment claims.265 While the hostile work environment might not produce a
tangible, adverse job action such as a firing or failure to hire, a plaintiff
may establish a cause of action by demonstrating that the hostile work
environment based on an individual's protected characteristic affected
the terms, conditions or privileges of her employment. 266 Even if the
plaintiff cannot demonstrate any economic damages in the form of lost
salaries or bonuses, she may collect compensatory and punitive damages
for emotional distress inflicted upon her by her equals. The recognition
264. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000). The ADEA already granted a right to a jury trial and
to double damage for willful violations.
265. See Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a
Coherent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443, 1450-51 (1996). See generally
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 557 (1986) (holding that Title VII created a
cause of action for a hostile work environment that altered the terms, conditions or privi-
leges of a person's employment because of her sex); Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510
U.S. 17 (1993) (concluding that a person can bring a hostile work environment cause of
action even though the woman does not have to leave work or have a nervous breakdown
if she proves that it is severe or pervasive objectively and subjectively).
266. See generally Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington In-
dus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
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of harassment as a form of discrimination has expanded the law and
should broaden the interpretation of the definition of "employee." If vul-
nerability to discrimination is one possible factor in determining whether
an individual in an organization is an "employee," the courts should con-
sider vulnerability to emotional and dignitary harm as well as vulnerabil-
ity to tangible economic harm. Even an equity partner or shareholder
could be vulnerable to discrimination, ranging from economic loss to the
emotional distress caused by a hostile work environment.
It is not uncommon for white women and persons of color who are
considered "equals" of the white men to suffer discrimination at the
hands of their co-workers. In Walking Out on the Boys, author Dr. Fran-
ces Conley, a professor of neurosurgery at Stanford University and Chief
of Staff at the VA Palo Alto Health Care System, describes the egregious
sexual harassment that she endured for 23 years from other neurosurge-
ons with whom she worked. Finally, after realizing that her silence was
enabling the male doctors to sexually harass students and subordinates,
she resigned and made a public statement.2 67
Recent social science research also suggests that women in high level
jobs "equal" to men are not immune from discrimination. In "Saying and
Doing" vs. "Said and Done": Gendering Practices, Practicing Gender at
Work, Dr. Patricia Martin, a noted feminist sociologist, discusses her field
work in organizational behavior, which focuses on gender practices and
how men and women "practice gender."2 68 Dr. Martin observes gender
practices occurring to women who are "equals" in the workplace that
make it difficult for the women to thrive at work.269 Such practices in-
clude men's exclusion of women in their socializing behavior,270 and the
gendered assumption that even women who are equals will engage in
stereotypically "female behavior," such as answering the phone for the
men.27 1 Dr. Jennifer L. Pierce in Gender Trials: Emotional Lives in Con-
267. FRANCES K. CONLEY, WALKING OUT ON THE Boys 106, 109 (1998).
268. Patricia Yancey Martin, "Saying and Doing" vs. "Said and Done": Gendering Prac-
tices, Practicing Gender at Work, 17 GENDER & Soc'Y 342, 342 (2003); see also JENNIFER L.
PIERCE, GENDER TRIALS: EMOTIONAL LIVES IN CONTEMPORARY LAW FIRMS 103-42
(1995) (describing the different ways in which women and men litigators approach their
jobs and the influence gender has on behavior and identity).
269. Martin, supra note 268.
270. Id. at 357.
271. Dr. Martin tells a story that is illustrative of male-female relationships at work and
how gender is practiced to women's detriment even where the men and women are suppos-
edly co-equals. These stories raise themes that are familiar to most women working in a
male-dominated environment, especially to women lawyers, partners, and associates work-
ing in law firms.
The first story goes as follows:
Tom and Betsy, both vice presidents in a Fortune 100 company, stood talking
in a hallway after a meeting. Along the hallway were offices but none was
theirs. A phone started to ring in one office and after three or so rings, Tom
said to Betsy, "Why don't you get that?" Betsy was surprised by Tom's re-
quest but answered the phone anyway and Tom returned to his office. After-
wards, Betsy found Tom to ask if he realized what he had done. She told
him: "I'm a vice-president too, Tom, and you treated me like a secretary.
What were you thinking?" Betsy's reaction surprised Tom. He did not mean
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temporary Law Firms, describes her study of paralegals and lawyers in a
large law firm and a corporate legal office. She notes that, "gender
shapes the experiences of women in the legal profession at the structural
level at the same time that women and men as litigators reproduce gen-
der at the micro-level of interactions and identity. '272
Furthermore, there is much research demonstrating the changing mo-
res of law firm partnerships. 273 While the competition for business has
increased, so has lawyer mobility. According to Professor Robert W. Hill-
man, these changes have had "a profound effect on the relations of part-
ners within law firms. ' 274 The "most dramatic effect" Professor Hillman
notes, is the "reallocation of a firm's income in favor of partners with
loyal client bases, an event that often is combined with a consolidation of
management in the hands of these same lawyers. '275 These diverse bodies
of scholarly literature highlight the danger that a partner may be vulnera-
ble to illegal discrimination. No longer can partnerships hide behind the
veil of intimacy, trust, and proprietary interest when discrimination im-
pedes a partner's ability to function and thrive at work. Instead, the
courts must consider all of the circumstances surrounding the relationship
to determine the vulnerability of the partner to discrimination and its ef-
fects before determining whether the partner is an employee.
D. EMPLOYEE COVERAGE: CONNECTEDNESS AND SOCIAL, ECONOMIC,
AND/OR POLITICAL POWER
Whereas the relationships between working partners ordinarily differs
substantially from that of an independent contractor and the business
with whom it contracts, consideration of the courts' distinction between
anything by his action, he said, commenting: "I did not even think about it."
Tom apologized to Betsy. She told Tom his behavior was ".... typical of how
men in High Tech Corporation [a pseudonym] treat women. You're patron-
izing and [you] don't treat us as equals." Tom was again surprised and de-
cided to ask other women if they agreed with Betsy.
Id. at 346. Dr. Martin notes that both Tom and Betsy were practicing gender in this
vignette. Tom, who expected Betsy to answer the telephone for him, treated her as a
subordinate, as someone whose responsibility it was to be his helper. Betsy, in turn, while
feeling surprised at Tom's expectation, answered the telephone. Betsy was practicing gen-
der by acting as Tom's helper and subordinate. She further practiced gender when she
raised the issue to Tom later, distinguishing herself from the common secretary. She did
not question whether Tom had the right to ask a secretary to answer the phone. That is,
she found it acceptable and within the normal order of things for Tom to expect a secre-
tary, who is more likely a female, to help him. It was not acceptable, however, for Tom to
treat Betsy like a secretary. Id. at 346-47.
272. PIERCE, supra note 268, at 104, 107-08 (finding that women lawyers face exclusion-
ary practices by male colleagues in informal socializing, an important mechanism for ob-
taining trust in the law firm, by being subject to reminders that they are not part of the
male culture and by sexual harassment).
273. See e.g., Hillman, supra note 186, at 1067; Hillman, Legal Profession, supra note
253, at 413 (1998); Hillman, Grabbing and Leaving, supra note 253 (discussing the conflict-
ing obligations lawyers in law partnerships have under the professional rules, agency, part-
nership, and tort laws); Pearce, supra note 253.




independent contractors and employees should enlighten the formulation
of a test to decide which partners are employees. The distinction between
independent contractor and employee, according to the courts, rests with
the power the employer has to control the worker. The more power an
employer possesses to control the worker and the manner of production,
the more likely the worker will be an employee. The original use of the
control test was to decide whether the business should be liable for the
negligent acts of a worker who injures a third party, not to determine
what obligations the employer owes to a worker. This use illustrates the
limitations of control as the dominant factor in deciding the difference
between an employee and an independent contractor. Control as a mea-
sure of employer liability to third parties is effective because it rests on
the notion that an employer should be liable for a worker's negligence
only if the employer has the means to prevent it.276 Control is not, how-
ever, the optimal consideration for determining the relationship between
the employer and the worker and whether that relationship constitutes an
employer-employee relationship. That relationship should depend on, I
propose, whether the worker is connected to, and dependent on, the busi-
ness economically and/or socially, factors which are more appropriate to
the determination of who is an independent contractor excluded from
coverage of the acts.
1. Independent Contractors: Justifications for Exclusions from
Coverage
There is general agreement that the anti-discrimination laws exclude
independent contractors from coverage. In Beyond "Economic Reali-
ties:" The Case for Amending Federal Employment Discrimination Laws
to Include Independent Contractors, however, authors Lewis Maltby and
David Yamada argue that the anti-discrimination laws should be
amended to cover independent contractors and their employees. 277 Their
recommendation stems from a concern for the rise of contingent workers,
many of whom are lowly paid, vulnerable to discrimination, and treated
as independent contractors by the courts under the common law, eco-
nomic realities and/or hybrid tests. 278 Coverage of independent contrac-
tors and their employees, Maltby and Yamada argue, would offer legal
protections to the maximum number of employees, avoid tampering with
the common-law definitions of "employee" and "independent contrac-
tor," and remove incentives from employers who classify workers as "in-
276. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 10 (2000). Tort law has also added
another justification for holding employers liable for the negligence of its workers: the
ability to spread the risk to the entity that is most able to pay the insurance and to guaran-
tee compensation to injured accident victims. To some extent, then, even in the third party
cases, the law has changed to favor more compensation of victims.
277. Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond "Economic Realities": The Case for
Amending Federal Employment Discrimination Laws to Include Independent Contractors,
38 B.C. L. REv. 239 (1997).
278. See id. at 242.
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dependent contractors" to avoid coverage of the anti-discrimination
laws. 279
Maltby and Yamada correctly note the difficulty courts have had in
distinguishing independent contractors from employees when using the
control test. While passage of Maltby and Yamada's proposed amend-
ment would offer the most protection to the most individuals, theoreti-
cally, there are legitimate justifications for excluding "true" independent
contractors, as I define them, from coverage. These justifications include
the economic and social independence of the independent contractor
from the business with whom it contracts. A new, narrower definition of
independent contractor would protect those who are truly vulnerable to
discrimination at work, while continuing to exempt "true" independent
contractors from the coverage by the statute.280
The key factors for distinguishing an independent contractor from an
employee should be the connectedness with and dependence on the insti-
tution, both economically and socially, that the employee has and the in-
dependent contractor lacks. This test goes beyond any test previously
used because it gives weight to social conditions at the workplace as well
as the economic dependence of the worker on the work in question. It
would consider the relationships between the alleged independent con-
tractor and the party sued, rather than relying on a long list of factors,
with a predominant factor of control.
According to this proposed test, typically, an independent contractor
would have his or her own business with an objective different from the
regular business of the company with whom it contracts to provide ser-
vices or goods. An independent contractor would likely have contracts to
work for more than one business and would lack an ongoing relationship
with the business with whom it contracts. While it may enter into a series
of contracts to perform services for a particular business, these contracts
regularly provide a service or produce a product in which the indepen-
dent contractor has expertise that is lacking by the business with whom it
contracts. The independent contractor may also have a physical distance
from the business. Often, it performs the services in a location that is
remote from the business with little or no supervision by the business
with whom it contracts. Furthermore, there is normally a social distance
that the independent contractor and its employees will experience from
the business with which it contracts; it will not enter into the same social
relationships with the employees of the business and has less of a social
connection than normally made by "employees" working at the same
workplace.
An employee, in contrast, forms a social network of "trust, solidarity
279. Id. at 266.
280. Independent contractors are protected from discrimination on the basis of race
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
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and affection."'281 These bonds, which I refer to as "connection" to the
institution, create an increased vulnerability to the effects-both eco-
nomic and dignitary-of discrimination. An employee who is more con-
nected will find discrimination more difficult both economically and
socially than an unconnected independent contractor. As defined here,
an independent contractor most likely has other sources of income that
make his or her separation from the contract less economically devastat-
ing. Moreover, the independent contractor's lack of social and emotional
connection presupposes a disengagement from the enterprise and its per-
sonnel. While the disengagement would not necessarily prevent discrimi-
nation, it would make an independent contractor and its employees less
vulnerable to the effects of discrimination because the independent con-
tractor is not as socially or economically dependent upon the employer as
an employee would be. An independent contractor may still be vulnera-
ble to discrimination that would otherwise be illegal if he were an em-
ployee, but any discrimination against the independent contractor would
likely have a less negative effect on the independent contractor than it
would have on an employee. 282
While the common-law control test currently used to distinguish inde-
pendent contractors from "employees" measures to some extent the con-
nection with and dependence on the institution, it is a rough measure,
focusing only on one factor that may or may not sufficiently demonstrate
the economic and/or social vulnerability of the worker to discrimination.
2. Partners: Exclusions Based on Economic, Social, and Political
Power
As with independent contractors, most courts and commentators also
agree that the anti-discrimination laws ordinarily do not cover part-
ners.2 83 The theory underlying this conclusion is that partners are owners
of the business and therefore cannot be "employees." Implicit is the as-
sumption that owners have sufficient power to avoid discrimination. This
conclusion has some intellectual appeal, but it suffers upon analysis.
By virtue of their membership in the partnership, partners are con-
nected to the enterprise in a way that independent contractors are not.
Thus, a singular focus on connectedness and dependence will not distin-
guish between those partners who are "employees" and those who are
not. While a partner's connection to the firm alone is insufficient to
prove that he or she is an "employee," the connection is relevant because
the connection will make it more difficult to extricate him or herself from
281. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together, the Workplace, Civil Society, and the
Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 1, 8 (2000).
282. Of course, if all employers refused to deal with the independent contractor be-
cause of her sex or other protected characteristic, the conclusion that an independent con-
tractor is less vulnerable to the effects of discrimination would be undermined. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 prohibits discrimination in private contracting based on race; however, it does not
reach sex.
283. See e.g., 1 LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 4.03 (2003).
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the partnership and may cause greater economic and dignitary harm if
discrimination does occur. Besides connection and dependence, how-
ever, in the case of a partner, the courts should consider the power or
lack thereof that the partner wields, economically, socially and politically
and whether that power is sufficient to avoid discrimination. Even if the
partner's power is insufficient to avoid discrimination, courts should also
consider whether the partner is more like an independent contractor in
that he or she is not connected or dependent on the partnership either
socially or economically.
The two key issues, therefore, to determining whether a partner should
be considered an employee under the anti-discrimination acts are the
power the partner wields and the connection the person has with the
partnership. The test for excluding a partner from coverage as an "em-
ployee" should be whether by virtue of being a partner, an individual is
either: 1) powerful enough economically, socially and/or politically to
avoid discrimination; and/or 2) economically and socially independent of
the work conducted by the partnership as to be less vulnerable to the
effects of discrimination.
Partners who are equals may be powerful enough to overcome the bur-
dens of economic and social dependence on the partnership because they
may be able to avoid discrimination. Discrimination would ordinarily oc-
cur to a person who is socially, economically and politically less powerful.
Many partners, however, have insufficient power to protect themselves
from discrimination.
The problem with many of the cases deciding whether a partner is an
employee is that they focus only on the political power-whether a part-
ner has a vote in major partnership decisions or sits on important com-
mittees. This is the focus of the economic realities test. Political power
alone will rarely protect a partner from the possibility of discrimination.
Political power gives the partner a say, but depending on how many part-
ners there are, this power may be diluted. Furthermore, even when the
partnership is relatively small, the political power a partner has in deci-
sion making may iot protect her from non-economic discriminatory be-
havior such as a hostile work environment based on sexual or racial
harassment.
The social power a partner has in the partnership will often determine
who has the ability to make decisions or influence others' votes or, per-
haps even more importantly, to create the firm's environment. One ex-
ample of social power is noted by sociologist, Dr. Patricia Yancey Martin
in "Said and Done" vs. "Saying and Doing": Gendering Practices, Practic-
ing Gender at Work.2 84 Dr. Martin discusses her field work in organiza-
tional behavior, which focuses on gender practices and how men and
women "practice gender." Dr. Martin notes that power plays a role in
this dynamic. Because some persons at work have more power, those
284. See Martin, supra note 268.
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persons can often admit or deny that gender is being practiced.285 Ac-
cording to Dr. Martin, "[p]owerful men can deny that their behavior is
gendered and women often cannot challenge them. Denial does not
erase the harm women experience from excluding them, making them
feel out of place, or requiring them to 'act like men." 286 In fact, accord-
ing to Dr. Martin, referring to men's tendency to socialize at work and
exclude women, men's superior power permits men to define what they
do as work, even though women would define it as "behaving like
men.,"287
Finally, the economic power a partner wields will often affect his or her
ability to control himself and others at work. For example, in a law firm,
the partner who brings in the most income will likely have a great deal
more power than the partner who brings in little or no income. Much has
been written about the difficulty white women and persons of color expe-
rience in mainstream law firms because they lack the connections or the
personal characteristics to compete with white males to bring in busi-
ness.288 The law should analyze all of these aspects of power to deter-
mine whether a partner is someone whose power immunizes him or her
from discrimination.
Even if the partner is not immune from discrimination in the partner-
ship itself, the partner, like an independent contractor, may have little
economic or social dependence on the partnership and would, therefore,
like an independent contractor, suffer less from the discrimination.
Under these circumstances, the law could decide not to protect the part-
ner because he or she is not an "employee" of the partnership. This lack
of economic and/or social dependence would occur if the partner worked
for a number of enterprises other than the partnership, and worked away
from property owned by the partnership. But, if the partner demon-
strates dependence and connection, combined with a lack of economic,
social or political power, he or she is vulnerable to discrimination and its
effects and should be protected by the anti-discrimination acts. This de-
pendence and connection would normally occur if the work of the partner
is the same as that of the partnership and the partner does not work for
any other organization. Thus, the partner would be economically depen-
dent upon the organization in a way that an independent contractor,
under my definition, is not. The partner, unlike the independent contrac-
tor, often performs the work of the partnership in a physical locality
285. Id. at 357.
286. Id.
287. Id.; see also Cecilia L. Ridgeway, Gender, Status, and Leadership, 57 J. OF Soc.
ISSUEs 637, 652 (2001) (attributing the "glass ceiling" to "performance expectations and
legitimacy reactions created by gender status beliefs [that] create multiple, nearly invisible
nets of comparative devaluation that catch women as they push forward to achieve posi-
tions of leadership and authority and slow them down compared to men").
288. See Jennifer L. Pierce, 'Not Qualified?' or 'Not Committed?' A Raced and
Gendered Organizational Logic in Law Firms, in AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND Soc.




owned by the partnership and at the time when other partners are also
performing their work. The work often will be the main work of the part-
nership. The partner is often emotionally or socially dependent upon the
partnership to some extent just by virtue of the fact that he or she is
working at the partnership with partners on a regular basis.
With these analytical tools in mind-independence or connection, so-
cial, economic and political power-we should next explore the EEOC
standards adopted by the Supreme Court in Clackamas to decide whether
they successfully distinguish employees from workers who are not vulner-
able to discrimination and/or its effects because of their power in the
partnership or independence from the partnership.
E. CRITIQUE OF EEOC GUIDANCE: INADEQUATE MEASURES OF
POWER AND CONNECTION
The EEOC standards are a combination of the traditional standards for
distinguishing independent contractors from employees and those deter-
mining whether an individual should be treated as a partner, rather than
an "employee." As mentioned above, my thesis is that the EEOC factors
for determining whether a partner, shareholder, member, or director
should consider economic dependence or independence on the organiza-
tion, connection to the institution or lack of connection, economic, social
and political power in the institution or a lack of power.
1. Standard 1. "'Whether the organization can hire or fire the
individual or set the rules and regulations of the individual's
work'"
The underlying idea in this standard is that a person who is capable of
being hired or fired or whose work is controlled or regulated by the or-
ganization is more likely an "employee." The converse that is implied is
that if the organization cannot hire or fire the individual or set rules or
regulations governing the individual's work, then the individual is not
likely an "employee." The setting of rules or regulations seems to go to
the question of control in both senses: whether the person has the suffi-
cient connection in physical space and in time with the institution and
whether the person lacks the power to set his or her own rules and regu-
lations. This standard does not seem relevant in the setting of a higher
level professional worker. It is unlikely that the professional organization
will set "rules and regulations" concerning the worker's work habits. The
failure to do so, however, does not indicate that the individual is substan-
tially disconnected from the institution or sufficiently powerful to avoid
discrimination and its effects.
2. Standard 2. "'Whether and, if so, to what extent the organization
supervises the individual's work"'
Supervision of work might indicate that the person is not in business
for himself or herself, and, therefore, is likely not an independent con-
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tractor. This concept relates to the issue of connectedness, and conceiva-
ble powerlessness in the institution. If the organization provides little
supervision of the work, one could argue in the partnership context that
each partner is an independent contractor of the partnership. Lack of
supervision could mean lack of control and lack of connection. But a
partnership normally has connection even absent the day-to-day control
or supervision over each other's work. Generally, there is control by the
partnership. Like Standard One, this standard of supervision may not be
relevant in the context of high level professionals. 289 A doctor, who oper-
ates in a professional corporation, will likely not report to a particular
supervisor, but the organization may well have certain control over the
doctor. This control should create incentives in the doctor to practice in a
careful and appropriate manner.
3. Standard 3. "'Whether the individual reports to someone higher in
the organization"'
Once again this standard, similar to supervision, seems to be a control
question but one geared toward power as well. Partners might not report
to one particular person within the organization, but might report to each
other and/or the partnership. The partners, for example, may not report
on every deposition they have taken or on each suture stitched, but there
should be some oversight in a partnership, as well as in a professional
corporation. The reason for the oversight is that in a professional corpo-
ration and in a partnership, the partners and shareholders will be liable
for the malpractice of the other partners, and/or shareholders. This liabil-
ity should create an interest in practicing in a manner that is responsible,
ethical, and careful.
4. Standard 4. "'Whether and, if so, to what extent the individual is
able to influence the organization"'
This may be the most important consideration in the partnership con-
text if courts interpret it to require evaluation of the economic, social,
and political power that the individual has in the organization. If this
standard is interpreted merely to diagnose the amount of political power
an individual has, it underestimates the dynamics in the organization and
will lead to a narrower classification of "employee." Whether an individ-
ual has a vote, even if not delegated to a committee, depending on the
size of the partnership, is not necessarily determinative of whether the
person has the power to avoid discrimination. 290 The courts can realize
the purposes of the anti-discrimination laws by interpreting this standard
to grant permission to investigate all of the power relationships in the
partnership, including the economic, social, and political power.
289. See generally Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places,
95 HARV. L. REV. 947 (1982).
290. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
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5. Standard 5. "'Whether the parties intended that the individual be an
employee, as expressed in written agreements or contracts"'
This standard should play a very small role in determining whether a
partner is an "employee" or not. If a partner is vulnerable to discrimina-
tion and its effects, he or she should not be able to waive rights to the
law's protections in advance.29 1
6. Standard 6. "'Whether the individual shares in the profits, losses,
and liabilities of the organization.' ",292
This test is traditionally used to determine whether one is an "owner"
or "employer." This test, however, should not be very important in deter-
mining whether a partner is an "employee." One can share in both the
profits and the liabilities of a partnership and still be vulnerable to dis-
crimination because of a lack of economic, social, or political power.
Making this the distinguishing feature between an employee and a non-
employee is unrealistic for another reason: there are persons who the law
acknowledges are employees but who have significant ownership inter-
ests in the company.
A share in losses and liabilities alone is also insufficient to demonstrate
whether a person is powerful enough in the organization economically,
socially, or politically to avoid discrimination. Judge Posner recognized
this in Sidley Austin.293 In fact, responsibility for debts absent influence
in the organization could actually show the reverse: a lack of power.
Furthermore, using this standard to distinguish an employee from a
non-employee may unrealistically affect a privately held corporation.
The courts have assumed that privately held corporations have employ-
ees. If these "employees" share in the profits and debts, however, this
standard might wrongfully suggest that they cannot sue under the anti-
discrimination statutes.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
There are two possible solutions to the conundrum of defining "em-
ployees" in partnerships, professional corporations, and other business
forms: legislative reform and broad judicial interpretation.
A. LEGISLATIVE REFORM
The best solution would be an amendment to Title VII, the ADEA,
and the ADA establishing a category of "employee" including partners
of general or limited liability partnerships, shareholders and members of
professional corporations, and directors and shareholders of corporations
291. For a more complete discussion on waiver of substantive rights by contract, see
discussion supra Part IV.B.4.
292. See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 123 S. Ct. 1673, 1680 (2003)
(quoting EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 605:0009 (2000)).
293. See EEOC v. Sidley Austin, 315 F.3d 696, 704 (7th Cir. 2002).
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and members of limited liability companies whose regular business is to
perform services for the entity employer.
Unlike other category of employees, this category would create a re-
buttable presumption that these individuals are "employees" as defined
by the statute. The employer could successfully rebut the presumption of
"employee" status by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
the partner is sufficiently economically, socially and/or politically power-
ful within the firm to avoid discrimination and its effects or that the indi-
vidual is economically and/or socially independent of the employer as to
not be vulnerable to the effects of discrimination.
This amendment balances the concerns of the employer against those
of the individual partners or shareholders. It would be fairly easy for the
employer to rebut the presumption in a very small partnership where the
partner alleging employee status owned a majority share or where the
partner's connection to the partnership is so attenuated as to diminish the
effects of discriminatory treatment.
B. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
The second solution, in absence of a statutory amendment, is for courts
to interpret Clackamas to grant the courts considerable discretion in de-
termining which partners294 and shareholders are "employees." A court
would rely principally on the EEOC Standard Four, interpreting the stan-
dard functionally to require a factual inquiry into the economic, social,
and political power the partner wields or does not wield within the organ-
ization. This factual inquiry would ordinarily be a question of fact for the
jury to decide unless, applying the standard for summary judgment, no
reasonable jury could conclude either that the partner was not an "em-
ployee" or that the partner was an "employee."
The fact finder should consider whether the individual contributes sub-
stantially to the income of the organization, whether the individual has a
vote on all matters, the size of the organization and whether the individ-
294. RUPA establishes a duty of care from one partner to the partnership. It does not
permit, however, a total negation of the individual partner's liability based on the duty of
care.
While not yet decided by the Supreme Court, most courts of appeal considering the
question of individual liability for violations of the anti-discrimination laws have held that
the employer-organization, not the individual involved in perpetrating the discrimination,
should be liable to the discriminatee. See supra note 179. Thus, if the anti-discrimination
statutes were amended to define most partners as "employees" if a partner-employee sued
the partnership for discrimination against her, the partnership as a whole would be liable
for the damages resulting from the discrimination, if proved, even if only one of the part-
ners were responsible for the actions leading up to the lawsuit. Because partners in general
partnerships are jointly and severally liable for the debts of the partnership, however, each
individual partner would be liable for the costs of discrimination. If a partner sues as an
"employee" the curious result would be that the plaintiff as a partner would presumably be
jointly and severally liable for the judgment as well. While this may be an odd result and
depending on the size of the partnership may well leave the plaintiff to absorb the loss
caused by the discrimination, a plaintiff considering a lawsuit for discrimination would
likely be aware if his or her partners were judgment proof and unable to pay the judgment.
This plaintiff would be advised not to proceed with the lawsuit.
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ual's vote is diluted, and whether the individual exercises social power in
the workforce, influencing the dynamics of the organization. The answer
to these questions should guide the fact finder's conclusion on the ulti-
mate question of whether the plaintiff's role in the organization is not
sufficiently powerful to avoid both economic and dignitary harms result-
ing from discrimination.
The fact finder should also consider the connection the individual has
to the organization. If the plaintiff is sufficiently connected to the organi-
zation, economically dependent on the organization, and working with
other partners in the organization on a common goal, then, assuming that
the plaintiff does not wield sufficient power to avoid discrimination, the
plaintiff should be considered an "employee."
If the plaintiff does not have sufficient power to avoid discrimination,
but is sufficiently disconnected from the organization that the plaintiff is
not vulnerable to the effects of discrimination, either socially or economi-
cally, the plaintiff should not be classified as an employee. This lack of
connection would ordinarily occur where the partner does not work on
the premises with the other partners and perhaps works in other partner-
ships as well. Where a partner regularly works for the partnership which
is a substantial source of income for the partner, the partner should be
deemed to have a sufficient connection with and dependence on the part-
nership to meet the second prong of the test.
The difference between this proposal and the legislative amendment is
procedural. If Congress overrules Clackamas, I propose above that it es-
tablish a rebuttable presumption that a partner is an "employee" under
the acts, subject to a defendant's proof by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the partner either has sufficient power to avoid discrimination
or is sufficiently disconnected from the firm to suffer the harms of dis-
crimination. If, however, Congress does not overturn Clackamas, the
courts would be free to use the same substantive test I have prepared, but
consistent with previous law, the burden of proof would fall on the plain-
tiff to establish both prongs of the test in order to be considered an
employee.
VI. CONCLUSION: POWER AND CONNECTION TO
DETERMINE STATUS
The Supreme Court in Clackamas built its decision on two erroneous
assumptions. First, the Court assumed that partners ordinarily are not
"employees" of the partnership under the anti-discrimination acts. Actu-
ally, the opposite assumption would be more accurate for many partner-
ships. Second, the Court assumed that an individual cannot simultane-
ously be an "employer" and "employee" for anti-discrimination law pur-
poses. These errors led to the adoption of the EEOC standards which
focus primarily and with little reflection on the control that the employer
has over the individual to determine whether partners, shareholders, di-
rectors and members of professional corporation are "employees." This
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result unduly narrows the coverage of the anti-discrimination acts not
only of the individual partners and shareholders, but also, in small firms,
of other employees working in the firm where the failure to count part-
ners and shareholders means that the employer does not qualify as a stat-
utory employer.
To determine whether a partner or shareholder is an "employee" of the
partnership or professional corporation, the courts should examine the
economic, social, and political power the partner or shareholder wields as
well as the connection the individual has to the enterprise. If the partner
is powerful enough to avoid discrimination-both tangible and hostile
work environment-he or she is not an employee. If the partner lacks
power to avoid discrimination, he or she is an employee unless he lacks
the economic or social connectedness to the institution.
Congress can most effectively cure this error by amending the statute.
A less effective, but nonetheless very useful second choice would be for
courts to adopt a broad interpretation of the term "employee" pursuant
to the functional approach approved of in Clackamas, thus enabling more
coverage for partners, shareholders, and employees who seek redress for
discrimination under the federal anti-discrimination acts. This interpreta-
tion would rely primarily on EEOC Standard Four, focusing on not only
the political power but also the economic and social power or powerless-
ness of the individual and his or her connection to the institution.
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